



THE MINOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 
AARON L. NIELSON!F† 
Few aspects of administrative law are as controversial as the major questions 
doctrine—the exception to Chevron deference that bars courts from deferring to an 
agency’s otherwise reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute where doing so has 
extraordinary policy implications. Proponents of the major questions doctrine believe that 
the nation’s most significant questions should be decided by Congress, not agencies. The 
doctrine’s critics, however, counter that there is no sound reason to treat major questions 
differently from ordinary questions, if such a distinction even exists. The elevation of 
Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, two major proponents of the major 
questions doctrine, has reignited the debate. Both the doctrine’s friends and foes expect 
that the Supreme Court will soon begin more aggressively targeting major questions. 
This Article, however, argues that focusing on major questions is myopic. Minor 
questions—those bipartisan, “good government” policies that do not attract much 
attention but that a!ect countless individuals in small ways—also matter. Because of 
Chevron deference, Congress and the Executive Branch often have overlapping 
authority to tackle such minor questions. Yet if one branch acts, that decision confers 
positive externalities on the other branch: the non-acting branch bene"ts from a policy 
it wants without having to pay for it. When incentives are structured this way, 
collective-action dynamics sometimes may prevent either branch from acting. The time 
thus has come to consider what this Article dubs the “minor questions doctrine”—a new 
approach to deference that targets collective-action dynamics by reducing overlapping 
policymaking authority over minor policies.    
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial features of modern administrative law is 
the major questions doctrine—the rule that courts do not defer to an agency’s 
otherwise reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the 
interpretation “concerns a question of deep economic and political 
signi+cance that is central to the statutory scheme.”#F1 In a series of cases, the 
Supreme Court has applied the major questions doctrine to prevent agencies 
from adopting policies with “extraordinary” consequences.$F2 
 
1 Gundy v. United States, !#$ S. Ct. %!!&, %!'! (%(!$) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Je)rey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, !## HARV. 
L. REV. "*%, "+* (%(%() (describing the major question doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, The 
American Nondelegation Doctrine, "& GEO. WASH. L. REV. !!"!, !!"* (%(!") (similar); Josh Blackman, 
Commentary, Gridlock, !#( HARV. L. REV. %'!, %&! (%(!&) (similar). 
2 See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, *+# U.S. #(%, #%' (%(!') (rejecting an EPA 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act that would “bring about an enormous and transformative 
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority”); Gonzales v. Oregon, *'& U.S. %'#, %&+-&" (%((&) 
(rejecting a Department of Justice interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act that would have 
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As one might expect, the major questions doctrine is not popular in all 
circles.%F3 Critics argue that there is no reason why major questions merit closer 
scrutiny,&F4 if, indeed, there is a reliable way to tell the difference between major 
questions and regular ones.'F5 Critics also worry that this doctrine’s emergence is 
part of a broader attack on the administrative state.(F6 In light of the recent 
elevations of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, two major supporters of the 
major questions doctrine,)F7 both the doctrine’s supporters and critics believe that 
the Supreme Court will soon begin targeting major questions more vigorously.*F8 
Yet in this back and forth, something important has been overlooked: 
Chevron’s application to minor questions also merits attention. Minor 
questions—i.e., relatively uncontroversial, often bipartisan policies that help 
 
decided an issue of “earnest and profound debate across the country”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., *%$ U.S. !%(, !*$-&( (%((() (rejecting an FDA interpretation of the Food, Drug, & 
Cosmetic Act that would grant FDA “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a signi,cant 
portion of the American economy”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, *!% U.S. %!", %#! (!$$') 
(rejecting an FCC interpretation that would allow the agency to eliminate a “crucial provision of 
the statute for '(% of a major sector of the industry”); see also King v. Burwell, !#* S. Ct. %'"(, %'""-
"$ (%(!*) (refusing to defer to how an agency resolved a major question). 
3 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, !"#$s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, !#! 
HARV. L. REV. !, %&-%+ (%(!+) (criticizing the major questions doctrine as part of a larger attack on 
Chevron); Note, Major Question Objections, !%$ HARV. L. REV. %!$!, %!$% (%(!&) (arguing that the 
major questions doctrine “con-icts with [the Supreme Court’s] own understanding of Chevron 
doctrine”). But see Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major 
Questions” Doctrine, '$ CONN. L. REV. #**, #*$-&( (%(!&) (arguing that the doctrine is “worth 
preserving,” despite objections). 
4 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, *" WM. & MARY L. REV. !$##, !$*$ (%(!+) 
(rejecting the “presumption that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates big questions”); Kevin 
O. Leske, Essay, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, * MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. 
L. '+$, '"( (%(!&) (arguing the major questions doctrine is inconsistent with the separation of 
powers premises underlying Chevron deference (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+ (!$"'))). 
5 See, e.g., Note, supra note #, at %%(( (suggesting that there may be no “di)erence between 
‘major’ and ‘minor’ questions”); cf. Thomas v. Reeves, $&! F.#d "((, "%* (*th Cir. %(%() (Willett, J., 
concurring) (explaining that “[r]easonable judicial minds can, and do, di)er” about what is major or 
minor, which risks “‘I know it when I see it’ application” (citing Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, 
Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, &% ADMIN. L. REV. !$, '* (%(!())). 
6 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note #, at %+-%", ""-"$ (identifying a “growing judicial resistance to 
administrative governance and judicial concern over the constitutional legitimacy of the 
administrative state”); cf. Nicholas Bagley & Julian Davis Mortenson, Delegation at the Founding, !%! 
COLUM. L. REV. %++, %+"-+$ (%(%!) (discussing rise of “critics of the administrative state”). 
7 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, !(+ GEO. 
L.J. !#%#, !#"% (%(!$) (explaining Gorsuch’s skepticism of the administrative state more broadly); 
Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, $# NOTRE DAME L. REV. !'!$, !'##-#+ (%(!") [hereinafter Sohoni, 
King’s Domain] (explaining Kavanaugh’s “robust” approach to major questions). 
8 See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, "+ GEO. WASH. L. REV. $#(, $#' 
(%(!$) (“Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment to the High Court is yet another reason for interrogating 
the major questions doctrine.”); Marla D. Tortorice, Nondelegation and the Major Questions Doctrine: 
Displacing Interpretive Power, &+ BUFF. L. REV. !(+*, !(+& (%(!$) (arguing that Gorsuch’s distrust of 
administrative law manifests itself in his approach to the major questions doctrine). 
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the public but that are not especially salient—are ubiquitous. They include 
“good government” measures like making information more accessible, 
updating obsolete rules, or closing loopholes.+F9 The public is often better o, 
when the government addresses such minor questions. Yet contrary to the 
conventional view that Chevron deference inherently results in a more active 
federal government,#!F10 there is reason to fear that sometimes minor questions 
are not addressed because of deference. 
This counterintuitive claim is explained by collective-action dynamics. 
When two branches of government share the same policymaking space, a 
shared temptation to freeride may systemically push both toward inactivity. 
Policymaking for even relatively uncontroversial issues can be costly. Even if 
a policy is bene+cial overall, moreover, the costs to bring it about are not 
evenly distributed; the branch that acts will bear most of the costs but will 
only receive a portion of the bene+ts, creating positive externalities for the 
non-acting branch. Hence, where overlapping policymaking power exists, we 
sometimes should expect both Congress and the White House##F11 to prefer the 
other to act. And because both Congress and the White House often have 
that same incentive, it is possible that the equilibrium outcome is that no one 
acts.#$F12 Professor Daniel Hemel has examined this collective-action dynamic 
in the context of tax law. As he has explained, it appears that even when the 
White House has the power to increase tax revenue via regulation pursuant 
 
9 See, e.g., Susan Jensen, An Informal Legislative History of the Reauthorization of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, "# GEO. WASH. L. REV. !'!(, !'!! (%(!*) (explaining why the 
nonpartisan Administrative Conference of the United States, which addresses lower-pro,le issues 
of administration, enjoys “bipartisan support across the political spectrum”). 
10 This view cuts across ideological lines. Compare, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, "#' F.#d 
!!'%, !!**-*& (!(th Cir. %(!&) (arguing that deference “add[s] prodigious new powers to an already 
titanic administrative state”) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), with Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, !(+ 
GEO. L.J. !&!#, !&#* n.$& (%(!$) (explaining that one “pragmatic advantage” of Chevron is that it 
“allows agencies to act relatively freely” when “address[ing] new problems”). 
11 The “White House” here is used as a stand-in for an entity exercising executive power. Whether 
the President can lawfully direct how agencies use delegated authority is a disputed issue. The Supreme 
Court, however, has suggested that the Constitution demands such presidential control of agency 
policymaking or “the buck would stop somewhere else.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
!'( S. Ct. %!"#, %!$! (%(%() (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., *&! U.S. '++, *!' 
(%(!()). In any event, the White House appears to have increasingly taken control over agency 
policymaking in recent decades. See note !%&, infra. No doubt, the White House does not actually direct 
all policy. Although the fact that not all agency action is meaningfully directed by the President 
undoubtedly complicates the analysis, it does not defeat it. See pp. !%%+–%$, infra. 
12 See generally John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, *' ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS %"&, %"& 
(!$*!) (describing mixed strategies and coordination con-icts); Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s 
Power to Tax, !(% CORNELL L. REV. &##, &#$-'(, +(+-(" (%(!+) (using mixed strategies to explain 
patterns of taxation). To be sure, as explained below, overlapping authority sometimes results in 
more action, especially for popular policies. See pp. !%(*–(&, infra. That too can be a collective-action 
problem, but at least it does not prevent the emergence of bene,cial policies. Overlapping authority 
also, of course, sometimes enables action that would not otherwise occur. See p. !%!!, infra. 
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to policies that the President openly favors, sometimes nothing happens 
precisely because Congress could also implement that policy.#%F13 
This collective-action observation is relevant here because Chevron 
deference, by design, gives the White House greater power to fashion 
policy.#&F14 After all, at bottom, Chevron is a form of policymaking discretion 
that is grounded in a theory of implied delegation from Congress to the 
agency.#'F15 Because of deference, agencies have a freer hand to make policy. 
The expanded policymaking discretion that Chevron provides agencies in turn 
creates a larger overlapping policymaking space between Congress and the 
White House (i.e., the universe of policies that either branch can create), 
amplifying the risk of stagnation caused by collective-action dynamics. 
Notably, the risk of stagnation may be particularly pronounced for at least 
two categories of policies. First, stagnation is presumably more likely for 
policies with di,use bene+ts and concentrated costs. Most models of 
government action already predict that policymakers are less likely to act if 
the bene+ts are shared broadly and the costs fall on a narrow group.#(F16 That 
dynamic may be exacerbated, however, when policymaking power is shared 
and freeriding becomes possible. Because minor questions often +t that 
di,use-bene+ts-concentrated-costs mold (which is a reason why they tend to 
be less salient), the collective-action problem caused by deference may 
disproportionately a,ect them.#)F17 Second, stagnation is also presumably more 
 
13 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at &'' (explaining that “some revenue-raising measures that 
could be implemented via regulation or via legislation may not be implemented at all” because both 
the White House and Congress can act). 
14 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+, "&* (!$"') 
(explaining that interpretative discretion gives “the Chief Executive” authority “to make [more] 
policy choices” based on “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy”). 
15 See, e.g., id. at "'' (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Essay, The Constitutional Case for 
Chevron Deference, +! VAND. L. REV. $#+, $&( (%(!") (“‘[J]udicial deference to agency “interpretation” 
of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency.’ That is, an 
ambiguous agency statute is simply another way of doing something that Congress does all the 
time—namely, authorize an agency to make a policy choice.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, "# COLUM. L. REV. !, %& (!$"#))). 
16 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, The Constitutionality of Legislative 
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, !(* YALE L.J. '"#, *($ (!$$*) (“One of the fundamental 
problems of democratic politics is that concentrated interest groups have more in-uence . . . than 
di)use groups, even if the di)use groups represent a numerical majority.”); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, +' VA. L. 
REV. %+*, %"+ (!$"") (explaining that we should expect “concentrated bene,ts and, especially, 
concentrated costs to stimulate more interest group formation” and that “distributed costs or bene,ts 
will presumably not tend to produce as much organizational activity”) (applying MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ! (!st ed. !$&*)); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION #*+, #&&-+% (James Q. Wilson ed., !$"(). 
17 This is especially true because minor questions do not break down along partisan lines, which 
means that one path out of the collective-action problem—government gridlock—is less available. 
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likely for technical issues that require relatively more resources to address.#*F18 
When policymaking authority is shared and the costs of making policy are 
high, freeriding should become relatively more attractive. This characteristic 
also disproportionately applies to minor questions because technical issues 
are often inherently less salient. Minor questions thus should be unusually 
susceptible to a collective-action problem. Yet because minor questions are, 
well, minor, no one to date has recognized the danger. 
Compounding that danger, moreover, is the fact that collective-action 
dynamics may disproportionately have long-term effects for minor questions. 
By definition, major questions prompt widespread debate and political action, 
which may moot the need for judicial review. For instance, the Court had no 
need to consider whether to apply the major questions doctrine to the FCC’s 
“net neutrality” regulations—which then-Judge Kavanaugh urged should be 
treated as a major question#+F19—because intervening events mooted the issue, 
namely, the election of a different president.$!F20 The same is true for the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which the Supreme Court stayed on major 
questions grounds,$#F21 but which also was later mooted by a new presidential 
administration.$$F22 Even ordinary policies—those that are neither major nor 
minor, such as (perhaps$%F23) the policy in Chevron itself about whether the term 
“stationary source” allows the “bubble concept”$&F24—often are addressed by 
 
See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at &'' (explaining why political gridlock can defeat collective-action 
problems); see also pp. !%!*, !%%*, supra (explaining this point). 
18 Cf., e.g., Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, "& TEX. L. REV. !+(!, !+!%-!# (%((") (noting that it is di.cult to regulate 
“where the new information is technical or scienti,c, the payo) to the public from acting on it is 
relatively modest and di)use, and [a group] . . . will bene,t . . . from regulatory delay”). 
19 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, "** F.#d #"!, '%% (D.C. Cir. %(!+) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The FCC’s net neutrality rule is a major rule for purposes of 
the Supreme Court’s major rules doctrine.”). 
20 See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, $'( F.#d !, !+-!" (D.C. Cir. %(!$), a% ’g Restoring Internet 
Freedom, ## FCC Rcd. #!! (%(!"), rev’g Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, #( FCC Rcd. 
*&(! (%(!*). 
21 See West Virginia v. EPA, !#& S. Ct. !((( (%(!&) (granting stay); Application for Stay, West 
Virginia v. EPA, !#& S. Ct. !((( (%(!&) (No. !*A++#) (requesting stay because EPA “must point to 
‘clear[]’ congressional authorization whenever it ‘claims to discover in a long-extant statute an 
unheralded power to regulate a signi,cant portion of the American economy’” (quoting Util. Air 
Regul. Grp. v. EPA, *+# U.S. #(%, #%' (%(!'))). 
22 See Order Granting Motion, State of West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. !*-!#&# (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. !+, %(!$) (en banc) (dismissing litigation as moot). 
23 As will be apparent in this Article, drawing lines between major, ordinary, and minor 
questions can be di.cult—as the major questions literature already recognizes. That said, the 
Supreme Court does distinguish between ordinary and major questions, and distinguishing between 
ordinary and minor ones—although undoubtedly di.cult in application—is conceptually useful. 
24 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+, "#$-'( (!$"') 
(explaining the basis of the litigation, viz., whether the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air 
Act includes individual devices or “all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial 
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’”). 
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someone because they are deemed important enough. Yet for minor questions like 
whether to close small tax loopholes that Congress may never have intended to 
begin with, eliminate outdated tariffs that no longer achieve their policy 
objectives, or make technical changes to environmental law, each of which is 
discussed below, stagnation may be much more long-lasting. 
The conventional wisdom that Chevron necessarily enables greater 
government activity is thus incomplete. Sometimes deference leads to more 
action, but sometimes it might prevent action that would otherwise occur. The 
time, therefore, may have come for what this Article calls the minor questions 
doctrine. There are at least three options for such a doctrine. One involves 
expanding Chevron Step Zero$'F25 in a way similar to the major questions doctrine. 
Another involves recognizing a new species of Chevron waiver$(F26 that would allow 
agencies to prospectively renounce deference to certain possible interpretations. 
And the third involves flipping the Chevron presumption so that agencies only 
receive deference when Congress says so. The common denominator is that each 
option would eliminate overlapping policymaking space for minor questions. 
Although there are important counterarguments to a minor questions doctrine, 
reform may be necessary to counter the risk that deference sometimes thwarts 
rather than enables policymaking. 
I. UNDERSTANDING CHEVRON AND MAJOR QUESTIONS 
To appreciate the need for a minor questions doctrine, it is helpful to 
understand Chevron deference and the emergence of the major questions 
doctrine, which is an exception to the ordinary Chevron framework. 
A.  The Basics of Chevron 
The story of Chevron has been told many times before.$)F27 The gist is that 
the Supreme Court has held that Congress implicitly delegates to federal 
agencies interpretative discretion over the statutes they administer, within 
 
25 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, $% VA. L. REV. !"+, !$! (%((&) (de,ning “Step 
Zero” as “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”). 
26 Chevron waiver refers to the notion that a court will not defer to agency’s interpretation if 
the agency’s counsel did not request it in court. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving 
Chevron, "* U. CHI. L. REV. !$%+, !$%+ (%(!") (de,ning Chevron waiver as “the idea that an agency’s 
decision not to seek deference can prevent the application of the Chevron framework”). The Supreme 
Court arguably has recognized Chevron waiver, see Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, !'( S. Ct. 
!'&%, !'+' (%(%(), but the D.C. Circuit has rejected it, see, for example, Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, $%( F.#d !, %#, %" (D.C. Cir. %(!$), cert. denied, !'( S. Ct. +"$ 
(%(%(). The species of Chevron waiver proposed here is di)erent. Here, an agency could 
prospectively forswear judicial deference for certain policies. 
27 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, "' U. CHI. L. REV. 
+*+, ++% (%(!+) (acknowledging Chevron as “the most frequently cited case in administrative law”). 
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certain bounds, unless Congress directly speaks to an issue.$*F28 The Court 
famously articulated the two-step rule as follows: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well 
as the agency, must give e!ect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the speci"c issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.$+F29 
A reviewing court’s conclusion about which reading of a statute is the “best” one 
therefore need not be dispositive; if the statute is sufficiently ambiguous, the 
court will uphold the agency’s reading so long as it is reasonable.%!F30 For instance, 
in Chevron itself, the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s preferred plant-wide definition of “stationary source,” even though the 
D.C. Circuit had reasoned that the best reading would treat each individual 
smokestack as a “stationary source.”%#F31 The Justices did not disagree with the D.C. 
Circuit’s view on its own terms but held that the court asked the wrong question. 
Chevron thus departs from ordinary interpretation by giving the Executive 
Branch greater policymaking authority when statutes are ambiguous.%$F32 Put 
differently, Chevron acts as an implicit delegation of discretionary power to make 
policy through interpretation. 
Chevron’s seemingly straightforward rule has proven to be complicated. 
For instance, although the Supreme Court usually says that Chevron has two 
steps (is the statute ambiguous, and if so, is the agency’s interpretation 
reasonable?%%F33), the Court also sometimes suggests it really only has a single 
 
28 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, !$"$ DUKE L.J. 
*!!, *!!-!%; see also Peter L. Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” 
and “Skidmore Weight,” !!% COLUM. L. REV. !!'#, !!'* (%(!%) (characterizing Chevron deference as 
“space” within which an administrative agency has been “delegated or allocated authority”). 
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+, "'%-'# (!$"'). 
30 Id. at "''. 
31 Id. at "'(-'%, "&&. 
32 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note %*, at !$( (“Chevron might well be seen . . . as the 
administrative state’s very own McCulloch v. Maryland, permitting agencies to do as they wish so 
long as there is a reasonable connection between their choices and congressional instructions.”); 
Philip Hamburger, Response, Chevron On Stilts: A Response To Jonathan Siegel, +% VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC ++, +" (%(!") (“Chevron requires judges to abandon their duty of independent judgment.”). 
33 Chevron, '&+ U.S. at "'#. 
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step (is the agency’s interpretation reasonable?%&F34). Yet other times, the Court 
acts like there are more than two steps, for instance by asking whether the 
type of agency decision is one that Congress implicitly wants to trigger 
deference (“Step Zero”%'F35), the agency followed the proper procedures (“Step 
'.*”%(F36), the agency acknowledged the ambiguity (“Step One-and-a-Half”%)F37), 
or the agency’s reading was reasonable yet also for some reason arbitrary and 
capricious (which may be “Step Three” or “Step Four,” depending on your 
count%*F38). Even beyond confusion about Chevron’s steps, it also turns out that 
the very concept of ambiguity is ambiguous.%+F39 And whether an agency’s 
reading is “reasonable” can also be the subject of reasonable debate.&!F40 
Chevron deference is also controversial—and has been for a long time.&#F41 
No statute explicitly authorizes deference&$F42 and the Administrative Procedure 
 
34 See Entergy Corp. v Riverkeeper, Inc., **& U.S. %(", %!" n.' (%(($) (invoking the reasonableness 
inquiry at the “outset”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One 
Step, $* VA L. REV. *$+, *$+ (%(($) (arguing for a one-step version of Chevron). 
35 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, "$ GEO. L.J. "##, 
"#& (%((!) (describing “step zero”); United States v. Mead Corp., *## U.S. %!", %%$ (%((!) 
(articulating the step). 
36 See Michael Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step $.&, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & 
COMMENT (June %', %(!&), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-step-(-*-by-michael-pollack-and-
daniel-hemel [https://perma.cc/$U'T-JPBT] (“[W]e suggest that Encino is indeed a di)erent 
move—a move we’ll call ‘Chevron step (.*.’ If Chevron step zero asks whether Congress intended for 
the agency to ,ll gaps in the relevant statute, Chevron step (.* asks whether the agency has followed 
the proper procedure in ,lling the gap.” (discussing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, !#& S. Ct. 
%!!+ (%(!&)). 
37 See Hemel & Nielson, supra note %+, at +*+ (explaining the doctrine); see also Negusie v. 
Holder, *** U.S. *!!, *%!-%# (%(($) (applying a version of the doctrine). 
38 See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed 
and Why it Can and Should Be Overruled, '% CONN. L. REV. ++$, "#% (%(!() (“[I]t has been argued 
that the reviewing court should also apply the arbitrary, capricious standard to 
the . . . interpretation, adding a third or fourth step, depending on when or how you are counting.”). 
39 See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, !%$ HARV. L. REV. %!!", %!#& (%(!&) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (%(!')) (“Unfortunately, there is often no 
good or predictable way for judges to determine whether statutory text contains ‘enough’ ambiguity . . . . 
That’s because there is no right answer.”). 
40 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, $# NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. !''! (%(!") (explaining different courts’ approaches to Chevron Step Two reasonableness analysis). 
41 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative 
State, "$ COLUM. L. REV. '*%, '*& (!$"$) (“Chevron is a siren’s song, seductive but treacherous.”). 
42 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative 
and Judicial Discretion, "# GEO. WASH. L. REV. !%$', !#!#-!* (%(!*) (explaining that the 
Administrative Procedure Act (* U.S.C. § +(&) seems to grant “reviewing courts [the ability to] 
decide matters of law de novo, without any deference to the administrators’ views”). 
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Act’s text,&%F43 especially combined with the history of judicial review,&&F44 may 
cut against it. Going further, Justice Thomas has suggested that Chevron may 
be unconstitutional,&'F45 a view seemingly also embraced by Justice Gorsuch.&(F46 
Chevron’s defenders, however, question whether such criticisms can be 
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s hands-o, approach to delegation&)F47 and 
argue, pragmatically, that Chevron enables more e-cient administration of 
national standards.&*F48 Defenders of deference also invoke political 
accountability—a point made in Chevron itself.&+F49 Finally, when a statute is 
ambiguous, the argument goes, someone must make policy, and it makes more 
sense for that “someone” to be an expert agency.'!F50 
 
43 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, !#* S. Ct. !!$$, !%!! (%(!*) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that Chevron con-icts with the APA’s command that the “reviewing court 
[should] . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions” (quoting * U.S.C. § +(&)); cf. Gillian E. Metzger, 
Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, "( GEO. WASH. L. REV. !%$#, !#((-(! (%(!%) 
(“The Court made no mention of the APA in Chevron itself, and so far the statute has only played 
a minor role in subsequent decisions.”). But see Sunstein, supra note !(, at !&*&-*+ (defending Chevron 
as a plausible interpretation of the APA); ! KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § #.#% (Wolters Kluwer, &th ed. %(!$) (similar). 
44 See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, !%& YALE 
L.J. $(" (%(!+) (challenging whether Chevron is consistent with historical practice). But see Sunstein, 
supra note !(, at !&'"-*( (pushing back). 
45 See Michigan v. EPA, !#* S. Ct. %&$$, %+!% (%(!*) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Chevron . . . precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon what they 
believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction. It thus 
wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is,’ and hands it over 
to the Executive.” (quoting Nat’l Cable & Tel. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., *'* U.S. $&+, $"# 
(%((*)); Marbury v. Madison, * U.S. (! Cranch) !#+, !++ (!"(#)). But see Siegel, supra note !*, at $'! 
(resisting this argument). 
46 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, "#' F.#d !!'%, !!*& (!(th Cir. %(!&) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that Chevron violates Article III of the Constitution); id. at !!'$ (“[T]he 
fact is Chevron and [its progeny] permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core 
judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little 
di.cult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”). 
47 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note #, at '! (“Article III may in fact militate in favor of deference 
to expert elucidation of statutory standards if the questions at issue require specialized expertise or 
experience that the federal courts lack.”). 
48 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, "+ COLUM. L. REV. !($#, !!!% (!$"+) (arguing that 
different interpretations among different courts could make it difficult to administer laws uniformly). 
49 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+, "&* (!$"') 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”). 
50 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note #, at $' (disputing the view that “[i]f Congress chooses to 
delegate regulatory authority to agencies, part of the price of delegation may be that the court, not 
the agency, must hold the power to say what the statute means” (quoting Farina, supra note '!, at 
'$")); cf. Pension Bene,t Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., '$& U.S. &##, &*!-*% (!$$() (“[T]he judgments 
about the way the real world works that have gone into the [agency’s] policy are precisely the kind 
that agencies are better equipped to make than are courts. This practical agency expertise is one of 
the principal justi,cations behind Chevron deference.”). 
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Implicit in many of these defenses of deference is the premise that 
Chevron, like other species of delegation, is good because it allows the 
Executive Branch to make policy, which frees up Congress to act on other 
matters or allows the federal government to address issues when Congress is 
deadlocked.'#F51 Yet the notion that Chevron allows the Executive Branch to 
make policy is controversial in part precisely because many believe that too 
much policy is made.'$F52 Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, has called Chevron 
“a powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal.”'%F53 Notably, in recent 
years, an increasingly skeptical view of deference has been embraced by many 
federal judges who oppose the enhanced interpretative discretion that 
Chevron provides agencies.'&F54 
Following the confirmations of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, 
many expect the Supreme Court to further limit Chevron’s domain.''F55 In fact, 
 
51 Cf. John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, !( GREEN BAG %D !$!, !$% (%((+) (explaining 
the theory that delegation “permit[s] [Congress] to accomplish more in the public interest”). 
52 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, "#' F.#d !!'%, !!*! (!(th Cir. %(!&) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (criticizing Chevron for enabling lawmaking “without the inconvenience of having to 
engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes,” i.e., another “form of Lawmaking 
Made Easy, one that permits all too easy intrusions on the liberty of the people” (citing Manning, 
supra note *!, at %(%)); Charles J. Cooper, The Flaws of Chevron Deference, %! TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
#(+, #(" (%(!+) (“Today the administrative state is essentially a sovereign unto itself, a one-branch 
government whose regulatory grasp extends into virtually every human activity.”); Hamburger, supra 
note #%, at "%-"# (“Chevron is a . . . judicial e)ort to expand the administrative state.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, # N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY '$!, *(* (%((") (“[D]eference . . . ignores the danger that good bureaucrats will be more 
intent on expanding their power than behaving like disinterested experts . . . .”). Unsurprisingly, the 
view that Chevron is the reason for a larger federal government is not universally held. See, e.g., 
Terence J. McCarrick, Jr., In Defense of a Little Judiciary: A Textual and Constitutional Foundation for 
Chevron, ** SAN DIEGO L. REV. **, "* (%(!") (“So, what—if not Chevron—accounts for the 
continued expansion of the administrative state? Conscious political choice.”). 
53 City of Arlington v. FCC, *&$ U.S. %$(, #!' (%(!#) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also 
Heinzerling, supra note ', at !$*" (noting “the Chief Justice’s evident desire to trim the power of 
administrative agencies”). 
54 See, e.g., Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Re'ections After (Almost) Ten 
Years on the Bench, +( VAND. L. REV. EN BANC #!*, #%' (%(!+) (criticizing administrative agencies’ 
sense of entitlement and “sloppy work” that result from Chevron deference); Egan v. Del. River Port 
Auth., "*! F.#d %&#, %+" (#d Cir. %(!+) (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he problems 
[created by Chevron deference] are serious and ought to be ,xed.”); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking 
Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, !& GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y !(# (%(!") 
(documenting examples of judges criticizing Chevron); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, !#! 
HARV. L. REV. !%$", !#(% (%(!") (using a survey to show that most of the participating federal circuit 
judges “are not fans of Chevron, with the signi,cant exception of the judges we interviewed from 
the D.C. Circuit”). 
55 E.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, +( DUKE L.J. 
$#!, $#'-#* (%(%!); Metzger, supra note #, at !+. Although she has said less about the subject than 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, some commentators speculate that Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s 
con,rmation may lead to revision of Chevron. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, 
Foreword: The Future of Chevron Deference, +( DUKE L.J. $#!, !!!& (%(%!) (noting speculation). 
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the Court has already begun to do so. In Epic System Corp. v. Lewis, Justice 
Gorsuch, writing for the Court, held that Chevron does not apply when the 
Department of Justice disagrees with an independent agency about how to read 
a statute.'(F56 The Court has also arguably disparaged Chevron itself.')F57 And in Kisor 
v. Wilkie, a majority of the Court upheld a weakened form of Auer deference 
(which applies when an agency interprets a regulation rather than a statute).'*F58 
Although Chief Justice Roberts joined parts of the Kisor opinion, he declined to 
similarly defend Chevron on stare decisis grounds.'+F59 
B. The Major Questions Doctrine 
Driven by nondelegation concerns(!F60 and its associated fear of government 
“overreach,”(#F61 the Supreme Court over the last few decades has developed an 
exception to Chevron known as the major questions doctrine. Under the 
doctrine, a court—in “extraordinary cases”—will set aside the ordinary 
Chevron framework altogether on the theory that absent an “express[]” 
statement from Congress, judges should not assume that Congress would 
have delegated “a question of deep ‘economic and political signi+cance’” to 
an agency.($F62 In this way, the major questions doctrine resembles the rule of 
 
56 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, !#" S. Ct. !&!%, !&#( (%(!") (“[D]eferring to the Executive on 
grounds of political accountability . . . becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides 
of its mouth, articulating no single position on which it might be held accountable.”); cf. Hickman 
& Nielson, Future of Chevron Deference, supra note **, at !!!*-!& (explaining that lawyers may be 
reluctant to cite Chevron). 
57 See, e.g., SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, !#" S. Ct. !#'", !#*" (%(!") (“But whether Chevron should remain 
is a question we may leave for another day.”); see also Pereira v. Sessions, !#" S. Ct. %!(*, %!%! (%(!") 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, 
the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”). 
58 See Kisor v. Wilkie, !#$ S. Ct. %'(( (%(!$) (upholding, but modifying, Auer v. Robbins, *!$ U.S. 
'*% (!$$+)). 
59 See id. at %'%* (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“Issues surrounding 
judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised 
in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress. I 
do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.” (citing Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., '&+ U.S. "#+ (!$"'))). 
60 See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, !#$ S. Ct. %!!&, %!'% (%(!$) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major questions doctrine 
in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by 
transferring that power to an executive agency.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note *, at %# (“The Court 
is alarmed by excessive delegation but is wary about directly enforcing the nondelegation doctrine—
so it looks for more judicially manageable proxies.”). 
61 See, e.g., Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, +( VAND. L. REV. 
+++, +"* (%(!+) (explaining that the Court’s “hesitance to apply Chevron in its pure, unvarnished 
form” is driven in part by fear of “executive overreach”). 
62 King v. Burwell, !#* S. Ct. %'"(, %'""-"$ (%(!*) (citations omitted); see also Jonas J. 
Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, &" ADMIN. L. REV. ''*, ''* (%(!&) 
(analyzing the doctrine). 
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interpretation that courts should address nondelegation concerns by reading 
statutes narrowly.(%F63 
That said, it has taken time to place where the major questions doctrine 
+ts in administrative law. In arguably the +rst case(&F64 in the line, MCI v. 
AT&T, Justice Scalia framed the inquiry at Chevron’s +rst step,('F65 on the 
theory that an ambiguity for Chevron purposes cannot exist where the agency’s 
interpretation would work “a fundamental revision of the statute” that 
violates “the heart” of scheme.((F66 The Court then continued to apply a step 
one formulation in FDA v. Brown & Williamson,()F67 despite the presence of 
ambiguity.(*F68 Reviewing MCI and Brown & Williamson, Scalia later suggested 
the principle: “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one 
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”(+F69 That formulation has since been 
used by justices across the ideological spectrum in a number of cases.)!F70 
Recognizing that the Court’s approach to ambiguity in these cases, with its 
emphasis on the signi+cance of the policy question, di,ered from how 
ambiguity is treated in other cases, Cass Sunstein argued that the major 
questions doctrine is best understood as falling within step zero.)#F71 And in 
King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts appears to have agreed, concluding that 
certain questions—such as whether subsidies are available on federal health-
 
63 See, e.g., Gundy, !#$ S. Ct. at %!'! (“We still regularly rein in Congress’s e)orts to delegate 
legislative power; we just call what we’re doing by di)erent names.”) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); 
Mistretta v. United States, '"" U.S. #&!, #+# n.+ (!$"$) (“In recent years, our application of the 
nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, 
more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be 
thought to be unconstitutional.”). 
64 Then-Judge Breyer noted the idea earlier. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of 
Law and Policy, #" ADMIN. L. REV. #&#, #+( (!$"&) (suggesting that Congress is “more likely to have 
focused upon, and answered, major questions”). 
65 *!% U.S. %!", %%$ (!$$') (“Since an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to 
deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear, the Commission’s permissive 
detari.ng policy can be justi,ed only if it makes a less than radical or fundamental change in the 
Act’s tari)-,ling requirement.” (internal citation omitted)). 
66 Id. at %#!. 
67 *%$ U.S. !%(, !%*-%& (%(((). 
68 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, %((( SUP. CT. 
REV. %%#, %%& (arguing that the statute was ambiguous in Brown & Williamson); cf. Glob. Tel*Link 
v. FCC, "&& F.#d #$+, '!"-!$ (D.C. Cir. %(!+) (Silberman, J., concurring) (faulting Justice Scalia for 
“never conced[ing] that the word ‘modify’ was ambiguous [in MCI], which it was”). 
69 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., *#! U.S. '*+, '&" (%((!) (citing MCI, *!% U.S. at %#!; 
Brown & Williamson, *%$ U.S. at !*$-&(). 
70 See Loshin & Nielson, supra note *, at '+ (explaining that the entire Court has embraced the 
doctrine); see also King v. Burwell, !#* S. Ct. %'"(, %'""-"$ (%(!*) (defending the doctrine in a decision 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan). 
71 Sunstein, supra note %*, at %#&. 
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care exchanges—are too signi+cant for the Chevron framework.)$F72 King is 
noteworthy because the Court upheld the agency’s interpretation about the 
availability of tax credits on federal rather than state exchanges, but it did so 
without deference. Other cases in the major-questions line both deny 
deference and further reject the lawfulness of the agency’s interpretation. 
The major questions doctrine is also controversial. Its critics contend that 
there is no principled way to determine whether a question is “major” or not. 
After all, can a court reliably tell whether a policy “is truly an elephant—and not 
just a rather plump mouse,” or whether the ambiguity “is sufficiently 
unimportant to be a mousehole—and not just a rather cramped circus tent”?)%F73 
Moreover, if Chevron is premised on the notion that a politically-accountable 
agency is better positioned than a politically-isolated court to resolve 
ambiguities in statutes, then why should that analysis change depending on the 
importance of the issue?)&F74 Indeed, might principles of political accountability 
cut in favor of agency resolution of major issues, as presidents run for office on 
just such questions?)'F75 And for those who believe for “pragmatic”)(F76 reasons that 
robust administrative power is essential for the “effective” functioning of 
modern government,))F77 the whole idea of the major questions doctrine can be 
maddening. Some scholars have thus urged the Supreme Court to inter the 
doctrine outright,)*F78 or at least read it very narrowly.)+F79 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not backed away from it. Indeed, 
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, while on the D.C. Circuit, urged greater use of 
 
72 See !#* S. Ct. at %'""-"$ (holding that “the two-step framework announced in Chevron” does 
not apply “[i]n extraordinary cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
73 Loshin & Nielson, supra note *, at '*. 
74 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note ', at !$*$ (rejecting doctrine on this ground). 
75 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, !!* 
YALE L.J. %*"(, %&(& (%((&) (“[E]xpertise and accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal ,ction, 
are highly relevant to the resolution of major questions. Contrary to Justice Breyer’s suggestion, 
there is no reason to think that Congress would want courts, rather than agencies, to resolve major 
questions.”). This argument, of course, assumes that the major questions doctrine is designed to 
accurately re-ect what Congress intends. To the extent the Supreme Court believes that too much 
delegated power is unconstitutional and that the constitutional test turns at least in part on whether 
a policy is major, then constitutional avoidance might have more teeth for major policies. This 
Article does not address constitutional avoidance. 
76 See, e.g., Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations 
First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shu(e, "( U. CHI. L. REV. 
''+, '** (%(!#) (noting the “pragmatic” argument). 
77 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note #, at $%-$'. 
78 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note ', at !$*" (calling this method of interpretation 
“nonsensical”); Note, supra note #, at %%!% (“The Court should follow its own guidance and remove 
the major question excrescence from administrative law.”), 
79 See, e.g., Sohoni, King’s Domain, supra note +, at !'#$ (arguing that King should be read as 
only holding that “[a]gency action that triggers large-scale government spending on the basis of 
ambiguous statutory authority falls outside Chevron’s domain”); Massachusetts v. EPA, *'$ U.S. 
'$+, *#(-#% (%((+) (reading Brown & Williamson narrowly). 
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the major questions doctrine—which he called the “major rules” doctrine.*!F80 
According to Kavanaugh, the FCC’s decision to impose so-called “net 
neutrality” regulations should be evaluated and found wanting as a major 
question.*#F81 This statement hewed closely to recent Supreme Court decisions 
like Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.*$F82 Perhaps even more importantly, the 
Court itself stayed the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which 
would have signi+cantly a,ected the nation’s energy sector, on what appear 
to be major-questions grounds.*%F83 
In fact, not only has the Court shown no inclination to back away from 
the major questions doctrine, it has suggested a willingness to expand it. 
Recall that the major questions doctrine has been understood as an exception 
to Chevron, a statute-based presumption that Congress intends agencies to 
reasonably resolve ambiguities. Yet the Court may be willing to 
constitutionalize the doctrine, meaning that Congress could not even expressly 
empower courts to defer to agency resolutions of major questions when the 
relevant statutory authorization is ambiguous. Now-Justice Kavanaugh 
recently commended Justice Gorsuch’s “thoughtful” call to revisit the 
intelligible principle standard.*&F84 Kavanaugh then tipped his hand about what 
the new standard ought to be. Notably, that standard openly borrows from 
the major questions doctrine.*'F85 
 
80 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, "** F.#d #"!, '!$ (D.C. Cir. %(!+) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
81 See id. at '%%-%'. 
82 See id. at '%(-%! (citing *+# U.S. #(% (%(!')) (“It would have been a major step for EPA to 
regulate the greenhouse gas emissions of so many large and small facilities. But there was no clear 
statutory authorization for the EPA to do so.”). 
83 See, e.g., Application for Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, No. !*A++# (Jan. %&, %(!&) (successfully 
requesting stay on major-questions grounds); Jim Dennison, Note, A Cost-Bene)t Analysis-Based 
Interpretation of Reciprocity Under Clean Air Act Section !!&(C), !(# VA. L. REV. !*&!, !*"+ (%(!+) 
(explaining that the litigation “is likely to help clarify the major questions and elephants in 
mouseholes doctrines”). 
84 Paul v. United States, !'( S. Ct. #'%, #'% (%(!$) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of 
certiorari) (seemingly endorsing Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United States, !#$ 
S. Ct. %!!& (%(!$)). Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas while Justice Alito wrote that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider 
the approach we have taken for the past "' years, I would support that e)ort.” Gundy, !#$ S. Ct. at 
%!#! (Alito, J., concurring). 
85 As Justice Kavanaugh wrote in Paul: 
[T]he Court has not adopted a nondelegation principle for major questions. But the 
Court has applied a closely related statutory interpretation doctrine: In order for an 
executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority over a major policy 
question of great economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i) 
expressly and speci,cally decide the major policy question itself and delegate to the 
agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and speci,cally delegate 
to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate 
and enforce. . . . Justice Gorsuch would not allow that second category—congressional 
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II. UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE-ACTION DYNAMICS 
To understand the possible value of a minor questions doctrine, it is also 
necessary to understand an important principle of decisionmaking: sometimes 
less is more. In a group setting, what is rational for each individual may result 
in suboptimal outcomes for the group. This Part thus first explains how 
collective-action problems work generally and under what circumstances they 
are most likely to arise. It then offers solutions recognized in the literature. 
A. The Logic of Collective-Action Dynamics 
The law is no stranger to collective-action dynamics.*(F86 The basic idea is 
that sharing authority can lead to suboptimal outcomes.*)F87 When groups are 
involved, what is rational for each individual member may nonetheless result 
in outcomes that are irrational for everyone.**F88 
A classic example of a collective-action problem, and one that will form 
the basis for much of this Article, is the Snowdrift Game, also sometimes 
called the Chicken Game.*+F89 Imagine one car going north and another going 
south, when they both come across the same snowdrift that has blocked the 
road. The only way for either car to get through is if someone shovels the 
snow; there is no way to clear the road, however, that only bene+ts one of the 
 
delegations to agencies of authority to decide major policy questions—even if Congress 
expressly and speci)cally delegates that authority. 
Paul, !'( S. Ct. at #'% (emphasis added). 
86 See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., ' A.#d #$+, '!% (Del. Ch. %(!() (“A good 
board . . . does not su)er from the collective action problem of disaggregated stockholders.” 
(quoting In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., "+$ A.%d &(', &!$ (Del. Ch. %((*)); In re Inslaw, 
Inc., $#% F.%d !'&+, !'+# (D.C. Cir. !$$!) (“The object of the automatic stay provision is essentially 
to solve a collective action problem—to make sure that creditors do not destroy the bankrupt estate 
in their scramble for relief.”). 
87 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Response, Cybersecurity: Toward A Meaningful Policy Framework, $( 
TEX. L. REV. "+, $* (%(!%) (de,ning “a classic collective-action problem” as a situation “where 
everyone doing his or her personal best . . . is not going to produce an optimal result”); Robert D. 
Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section *, &# STAN. 
L. REV. !!*, !!+ (%(!() (“When activities spilled over from one state to another, the Framers 
recognized that the actions of individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation 
as a whole—the de,nition of a collective action problem.”). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of 
Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, && STAN. L. REV. %!+, %%& (%(!') (“[T]here is no 
standard de,nition of . . . ‘collective action problem’ in the legal literature. I will argue below that 
the term is often employed with some liberality, and even a touch of promiscuity.”). 
88 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION !$ (!$"+) (“[A] 
collective action problem exists where rational individual action can lead to a strictly Pareto-inferior 
outcome, that is, an outcome which is strictly less preferred by every individual than at least one 
other outcome.”). 
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, !&( U. PA. 
L. REV. %!"$, %%!+ (%(!%) (citing ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-
OPERATION AND WELFARE *"-&%, !%"-#% (!$"&)). 
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drivers. The worst-case scenario for both drivers is if no one digs, in which 
case no one moves forward. Thus, one might expect both drivers to pick up a 
shovel. Yet for each individual, it is best if the other driver does the work. 
While the worker is out in the cold, the non-worker can enjoy a warm vehicle. 
When this situation arises, both drivers may opt to stay in the car.+!F90 In the 
conceptually similar Chicken Game, two drivers are driving at each other. If 
a driver swerves out of the way, he loses face and puts himself at some risk of 
skidding into the ditch—a minor accident. Each driver thus wants the other 
to play “chicken” and swerve (i.e., act), but if neither driver swerves, a serious 
accident will result.+#F91 Yet because each individual driver is better o, if the 
other one changes direction, it is possible that neither driver will swerve, 
resulting in an accident. Thankfully, the worst-case outcome (either two cars 
stalled in front of a snowdrift or, even worse, in a +ery collision) does not 
always happen and when the costs of mutual inaction become dire enough, it 
is quite unlikely to ever happen.+$F92 But it can happen,+%F93 and how likely it is to 
happen depends on the players’ respective strategies. 
Freeriding—letting someone else work while you bene+t—is a common 
element of collective-action dynamics. “A rational individual reasons that if 
others engage in the behavior necessary to achieve the collective good, she 
can free ride on their e,orts and still gain the bene+ts of their behavior.”+&F94 
This free-rider problem is closely associated with public goods, “that is, non-
rival, non-excludable goods,” because “free-riders cannot be excluded from 
 
90 See Nicolas Suzor, Free-Riding, Cooperation, and “Peaceful Revolutions” in Copyright, %" HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. !#+, !+# (%(!') (“[W]hen you are faced with a snowdrift blocking a road, it is better to 
shovel it out of the way than to do nothing, better still if everyone shovels, best if someone else 
shovels while you do nothing, and worst for everyone if nobody picks up a shovel.” (citing D.F. 
Zheng, H.P. Yin, C.H. Chan & P.M. Hui, Cooperative Behavior in a Model of Evolutionary Snowdrift 
Games with N-Person Interactions, "( EUROPHYSICS LETTERS !"((%, !"((%-p! (%((+))). 
91 See id. at !+# n.%!* (citing Irwin Lipnowski & Shlomo Maital, Voluntary Provision of a Pure 
Public Good as the Game of “Chicken,” %( J. PUB. ECON. #"!, #"' (!$"#)); see also Yoo, supra note "$, 
at %%!+-!" (discussing the “Chicken Game”). If ,ery collisions are too outlandish for your taste, a 
more mundane example about newlyweds may be better. Love is real, but dirty dishes somehow still 
go unwashed in the sink. 
92 See EDWARD C. ROSENTHAL, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO GAME THEORY +' 
(%(!!) (“Not surprisingly, as the mutually destructive outcome becomes more severe, the players will 
play less aggressively.”). 
93 In fact, Thomas Schelling used almost this exact analogy in his classic treatment of nuclear 
deterrence: the ultimate game of chicken. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 
!!&-!" (!$&&). 
94 Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, "$ CALIF. L. REV. !%#!, !%'# (%((!) (citing ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION *-+ (!$$()); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 
!%' HARV. L. REV. !'%%, !'&* (%(!!) (“Information acquisition may often su)er from a collective 
action problem, in which each agent is tempted to free ride, shirking her own obligations to invest 
in costly research . . . .”). 
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obtaining the bene+ts these goods provide.”+'F95 If everyone bene+ts from a 
good, each person may decide to let someone else produce the good. 
Confronted with that incentive, however, it is possible that no one will bear 
the cost: “If an entrepreneur stages a +reworks show, for example, people can 
watch the show from their windows or backyards. Because the entrepreneur 
cannot charge a fee for consumption, the +reworks show may go unproduced, 
even if demand for the show is strong.”+(F96 To be sure, social norms may lead 
to cooperation.+)F97 And it is also possible that a show will be so valuable that 
someone will pay for it.+*F98 But sometimes no one does anything. And even when 
someone does act, at the margins, a collective-action dynamic may reduce the 
amount of activity in suboptimal ways. On the )th of July, lots of people still 
shoot +reworks even with a collective-action dynamic. But shows might be 
better without a collective-action dynamic. 
When two individuals can act and both face an incentive to freeride, game 
theorists have recognized that the rational move for each player may be to 
adopt a “mixed strategy” of sometimes acting and sometimes not.++F99 The ratio 
of action to inaction for each player depends on how much each values action, 
combined with an assessment of how much the other side values action.#!!F100 
How this works can be described mathematically,#!#F101 but the intuition is that 
“always acting” or “never acting” does not always make sense given what the 
other individual may do in response.#!$F102 
Finally, collective-action problems are both a common justi+cation for 
government intervention and a common explanation for government 
inaction. For instance, when it comes to public goods like building streetlights 
(a local problem) or providing an army (a national problem),#!%F103 the 
 
95 Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, &" CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
&#!, &#' (!$$#). 
96 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBR. OF ECONS. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/ 
Enc/PublicGoods.html [https://perma.cc/ND+K-UE+G]; see also id. (“If the free-rider problem 
cannot be solved, valuable goods and services—ones people otherwise would be willing to pay for—
will remain unproduced.”). 
97 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, !' J. ECON. 
PERSPS. !#+, !'( (%((() (explaining how social norms can increase cooperation). 
98 See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note $%, at +' (noting that as the costs of inaction increase, 
action becomes more likely). 
99 See generally Nash, supra note !% (explaining mixed strategies). 
100 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at +(+-(" (explaining how presidential and congressional 
actions are a function of the relative share of political bene,ts and costs borne by each branch). 
101 See infra note !**. 
102 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY 
AND THE LAW #+-#$ (!$$') (explaining mixed strategies and why rational actors may adopt them). 
103 See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article ", 
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, "# IOWA L. REV. *&$, &(% n.!#% (!$$") (“A collective-action 
problem exists whenever private markets are relied on to provide public goods, such as street lamps 
and national defense.”). 
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government may be best positioned to act because individuals may otherwise 
be tempted to freeride.#!&F104 At the same time, however, collective-action 
dynamics may also distort the law and lead to inaction. Where the bene+ts of 
a policy are di,use, for example, but the policy’s costs are concentrated, it is 
possible that no one will act to bring the policy about, or that a weaker version 
of the policy will emerge, because the policy’s would-be bene+ciaries will 
hope that someone else does the necessary work while a highly motivated 
interest group will oppose the policy.#!'F105 
B. Collective-Action Dynamics and Theories of Government 
Implicit in the foregoing is the point that how often collective-action 
problems prevent beneficial behavior depends on how decisions are made and 
in particular the values decisionmakers place on action and inaction. Those 
values, in turn, are affected by what motivates decisionmakers. To the extent 
that decisionmakers are motivated by altruism, it is relatively less likely that 
collective-action dynamics will prevent beneficial action.#!(F106 In the fireworks 
example, for instance, if a decisionmaker enjoys benefitting others (or just enjoys 
lighting things on fire), then the fact there is no way to prevent others from 
sharing in the experience is much less likely to prevent the show. The collective-
action dynamic arises because individuals like watching fireworks and would 
rather watch someone else’s than pay for their own. Or in the Chicken Game, if 
one driver takes pleasure in keeping the other driver safe, he or she may very 
well get out of the way without really playing the game. By contrast, if a 
 
104 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION !' (!st ed. !$&*) (“It 
would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the 
military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the 
costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary.”). That said, even for public goods, 
government action is not always necessary. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, !+ J.L. 
& ECON. #*+, #&#-&+ (!$+') (describing the historical role of private individuals in building 
lighthouses, a public good). 
105 This point should not be taken too far; cooperation is not impossible, even for large, di)use 
groups. See generally GUNNAR TRUMBULL, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: THE POLITICAL POWER OF 
WEAK INTERESTS (%(!%) (describing di)use consumer groups that have successfully lobbied for 
legislation). That said, at the margins, presumably it is easier to coordinate in small groups with 
intense interests than large groups with di)use interests. See Jonathan Rauch, Was Mancur Olson 
Wrong?, AM. ENTER. INST. (Feb. !*, %(!#), https://www.aei.org/articles/was-mancur-olson-wrong 
[https://perma.cc/P%SN-VPZN] (“Olson did not say di)use interests cannot organize, any more 
than Newton’s gravitational theory says you can’t walk uphill. He said it is harder, other things being 
equal, for di)use interests to organize.”). 
106 See Lu Gram, Nayreen Daruwalla & David Osrin, Understanding Participation Dilemmas in 
Community Mobilisation: Can Collective Action Theory Help?, +# J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMTY. 
HEALTH $(, $! (%(!$) (“In other situations, the direct bene,ts are excludable, but sharing still occurs 
out of altruism.”). 
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decisionmaker is less altruistic, then an inability to avoid freeriding may prevent 
a firework show from happening or result in a fiery crash. 
This point can be applied to theories of government behavior. What 
motivates government o-cials is a di-cult question, especially because the 
answer no doubt varies. Some o-cials may have pecuniary or other less-than-
noble interests in mind,#!)F107 while others may be more altruistic. Steven Croley 
has collected and summarized the leading theories.#!*F108 Especially relevant is 
the debate between those who subscribe to public-interest versus public-
choice models of government behavior—models this Article caricatures to 
more cleanly present the distinction. The premise of the public-interest 
model is that o-cials always try to do what is best for the public.#!+F109 A very 
simpli+ed version of public choice,##!F110 by contrast, posits that those in power 
look out for themselves, and are unlikely to do what bene+ts the public absent 
some element of personal advantage.###F111 Public choice theory, of course, has 
 
107 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: A Review Essay, !%+ HARV. L. REV. !$$!, %('% & n.%'+ (%(!') (book reviews) (collecting 
citations about the “revolving-door”); cf. DAVE BARRY, DAVE BARRY HITS BELOW THE BELTWAY 
$' (%((!) (“When they say ‘serve the nation,’ what they of course mean is that they want to be 
whisked around the nation in a motorcade, and -y on Air Force One, and be catered to by a large 
fawning entourage . . . .”). 
108 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, $" 
COLUM. L. REV. !, * (!$$"). For further discussion of theories of what motivates government 
regulation of the economy, see Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, * BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. ##* (!$+'). 
109 See Croley, supra note !(", at &*-&& (describing the public interest theory); Daniel Shaviro, 
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation 
in the !"*$s, !#$ U. PA. L. REV. !, & (!$$() (“[T]he public interest view emphasizes the importance 
of ideology and the desire to make good policy, which are seen as motivating legislators to seek to 
improve society (according to their perhaps controversial notions of what is good).”). 
Unsurprisingly, what an abstract concept like “the public interest” means in application is debatable. 
See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, "$ WASH. L. REV. #%$, ##& (%(!') (“Debate over 
what constitutes the ‘public interest’ enjoys a rich history both in political theory and in political 
action.”); Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, *$ UCLA L. REV. *(&, *%! 
(%(!%) (characterizing the question as “imponderable”). 
110 This is a simpli,ed version—no doubt too simpli,ed. As others have noted, the “homo-
economicus” view of human nature does not realistically portray how humans behave. See, e.g., D. 
Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, !($ MICH. L. REV. !(%$, !('( (%(!!) 
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (%(($)). A more accurate portrayal of public choice would posit that the 
public good is only one of many things that regulators care about. Surely everyone who goes to work 
for government does so because they desire to see the public good promoted. Personal interests, 
however, play a greater role in the overall balance of interests in public choice. See id. (explaining 
the need for, and di.culties of, a broader conception of “self-interest”). For purposes of this Article’s 
analysis, however, there is value in a caricature—it more sharply illustrates the point. 
111 See Croley, supra note !(", at #'-#* (describing the basics of public choice theory); JAMES 
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY %+ (!$&*) (“Self-interest, broadly conceived, is recognized to 
be a strong motivating force in all human activity; and human action, if not bounded by ethical or 
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its share of critics, especially when taken to extremes.##$F112 Even so, that doesn’t 
mean the theory isn’t valuable##%F113 or that there are not examples of what looks 
like public choice in action.##&F114 
To the extent that government decisionmakers (e.g., members of 
Congress or Executive Branch regulators) are motivated by the public 
interest, we should expect less inaction when bene+cial policies for the public 
are on the table; by contrast, to the extent decisionmakers are motivated by 
public choice, we should expect more inaction. 
In reality, of course, the truth is presumably somewhere in the middle, 
especially when (i) the entire universe of decisionmakers is considered and 
(ii) the time-horizon is extended beyond a particular decision. The pool of 
decisionmakers presumably includes individuals at di,erent points on a 
(simpli+ed) public-interest-versus-public-choice spectrum and even public-
interest-minded individuals may make decisions that themselves are not in 
the public interest on the theory that ensuring reelection will enable more 
decisions in the public interest.##'F115 Likewise, even those who want to do good 
may fail in their attempt because they lack interest in a particular issue that 
would be bene+cial if acted on; unfortunately, because we have +nite 
 
moral restraints, is assumed more naturally to be directed toward the furtherance of individual or 
private interest.”); cf. Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, $# CHI.-KENT L. REV. !&*, 
!+% (%(!") (“A counter-intuitive result of legislative and regulatory processes is that those who bear 
the costs of regulation often lobby for its implementation . . . because they know that new entrants 
into the market will not be able to a)ord the additional costs.”); Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: 
Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, +* WASH. & LEE L. REV. #&+, ''!-'% (%(!") (making the same 
observation in the context of Dodd-Frank’s hedge fund regulations). 
112 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory 
in Legal Scholarship, %((% U. ILL. L. REV. !!#$, !!'+-'" (arguing that public choice theory is overly 
pessimistic). 
113 Tom Ginsburg made the following observation about the theory: 
Even if people are not self-interested, we may want to . . . assume that they are for 
purposes of institutional design. As long as some large proportion of human behavior 
involves self-interest—and even social constructivists would likely acknowledge that 
this is the case—it makes sense to take self-interest into account as we design 
institutions. Public choice-like insights have been utilized in this pragmatic manner 
for two hundred years. 
Id. at !!*'.; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION ' (!$$!) (“[E]ven if [the most extreme positions] do not fully capture 
the realities of government, they may still represent some important tendencies.”). 
114 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock & Jimmye Hillman, Public Choice and Agriculture: An American 
Example, in # ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS $", !('-($ (Partha Dasgupta ed., !$$!) 
(o)ering examples of potential public-choice decisions). 
115 See, e.g., Frank H. Hill, Democracy and Progress, & UNIVERSAL REV. !, !( (Harry Quilter ed., 
!"$() (“To get elected is the ,rst duty of a politician; to get re-elected is his second duty. What 
good can he do if he loses his seat?”). More generally, “there are many instances when the pursuit 
of narrow self-interest by groups may arguably bene,t the more di)use public.” Jody Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, !!& HARV. L. REV. !%"*, !#(# n.&+ (%((#). 
!#'# University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !!"! 
resources (including time), no one can address everything. We all have 
priorities. Accordingly, unless one believes that all policymakers only pursue 
what an objective observer would call the public interest, whatever one’s 
opinion of what generally motivates decisionmakers, we should worry about 
collective-action dynamics. 
C. How to Address Collective-Action Dynamics 
Finally, and of particular importance here, it is possible to mitigate 
collective-action problems. An answer to the Chicken Game, for instance, is 
a credible commitment mechanism.##(F116 If the drivers know that one cannot 
turn (for example, because she has openly removed the steering wheel), the 
payo, structure changes.##)F117 Then, the rational response is for the driver who 
can still steer to change direction.##*F118 Similarly, it may make sense for the 
government to intervene to prevent a collective-action problem—for 
instance, by itself providing a public good such as national defense.##+F119 In other 
words, if the collective-action problem arises because two can act, a solution 
to the problem is to take away that power from one of them. Other possible 
solutions include increasing cooperation—by encouraging bene+cial norms to 
that e,ect#$!F120 or by increasing punishment for lack of cooperation (itself a 
form of “encouragement”#$#F121). “Repeat-player” dynamics may also play a role 
(e.g., by encouraging cooperation for fear of punishment in the next iteration 
of the game), especially where the same parties are involved and know they 
are in an iterative game.#$$F122 
 
116 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT %%-%" (!$&() (explaining 
commitment mechanisms in game theory). 
117 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, !%% HARV. L. REV. !'(#, !''$-*( (%(($) 
(“These limits can often be conceptualized as legally imposed precommitment devices, similar to 
one party (A) tearing out her own steering wheel during a game of roadway Chicken with another 
party (B). If B indeed faces a Chicken Game payo) structure, he will see A’s precommitment and 
swerve . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
118 See LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS &' (%((() (explaining commitment 
mechanisms, including openly tossing aside a steering wheel). 
119 See Cowen, supra note $& (discussing national defense as a public good). 
120 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, $& COLUM. L. REV. $(#, $!" (!$$&) 
(“Good social norms solve collective action problems by encouraging people to do useful things that 
they would not do without the relevant norms.”). 
121 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, #! J. CORP. 
L. '*#, '&! (%((&) (“One solution, most associated with organized crime, is to kill the snitch.”). 
122 Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, !!" HARV. L. REV. !($$, !!#% n."& (%((*) 
(noting how “features” of “the legislative process, such as logrolling, a norm of collegiality, [and] the 
presence of repeat players” may act to “mitigate[] collective action problems”). That said, repeat-
player dynamics are not a cure-all. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Intermediary In'uence, "% U. CHI. L. 
REV. *+#, *$" (%(!*) (“[A]n industry structure conducive to collective action, combined with the 
strategic use of positional and informational advantages that intermediaries derive as repeat players 
in a particular market, may operate to entrench an ine.cient institutional arrangement.”); David 
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III. CHEVRON AND COLLECTIVE-ACTION DYNAMICS 
The conventional wisdom—shared by both those who are wary of “an 
already titanic administrative state”#$%F123 and those who believe agencies need 
authority to address “modern problems”#$&F124—is that delegation, of which 
Chevron deference is a species, by its very nature results in more federal 
activity.#$'F125 After all, the theory goes, absent Chevron, where an ambiguous 
statute is best read as foreclosing some policy, only Congress can create that 
policy. Because of Chevron, however, an agency can also sometimes create the 
policy in that situation.#$(F126 So, on the theory that two is more than one, we 
should expect that more policy will be created (or at least more activity will 
occur, including deregulation). Both sides of the ideological debate about 
Chevron share the premise. They just disagree about whether increased 
activity should be applauded. 
Yet that shared premise may be false, or at least incomplete. To be sure, the 
premise may be true for major questions; indeed, one reason the White House 
uses regulatory power for high-profile policy issues is because Congress refuses 
to enact new legislation.#$)F127 This means that if the Supreme Court continues to 
 
Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, !'" U. PA. L. REV. '+#, '"% (!$$$) 
(explaining why it can “more di.cult to control opportunism than the ‘repeat player’ story might 
lead one to believe,” including the lack of good information about what has happened and why). 
123 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, "#' F.#d !!'%, !!** (!(th Cir. %(!&) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
124 Cf. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rako), In Defense of Big Waiver, !!# COLUM. L. REV. %&*, 
%$%-$# (%(!#) (explaining that “open-ended, broad delegations of regulatory authority” enable “the 
administrative state [to] be responsive to modern problems”). 
125 See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and 
Constitutional Exceptions, $% NOTRE DAME L. REV. !$(+, !$!! (%(!+) (“[T]he Chevron doctrine 
encourages agency aggressiveness on a large scale. Under the guise of ambiguity, agencies can stretch 
the meaning of statutes enacted by Congress to accommodate their preferred policy outcomes.”). 
126 The President, the White House, and federal agencies do not always overlap in terms of 
agenda. See Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, !!' MICH. L. REV. &"#, &"& (%(!&) 
(“[A]dministrative law has failed to take the complexity and variety of presidential control into 
account.”); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, !%& HARV. L. REV. !+**, 
!+&! (%(!#) (“Presidents delegate regulatory review to a number of agents . . . who themselves 
disagree and con-ict over what the President desires.”). Nevertheless, it is no secret that the 
Presidency, acting through White House personnel, has increasingly assumed greater control of the 
agencies and their regulatory actions. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, !!' 
HARV. L. REV. %%'*, %%+%-"! (%((!) (describing this trend). Some argue that Article II of the 
Constitution requires such control—a question beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Neomi 
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, +$ 
FORDHAM L. REV. %*'!, %**$ (%(!!) (emphasizing Article II’s vestiture of executive power in a 
singular president). For purposes here, the President, the White House, and federal agencies will 
be con-ated for ease of exposition. The central insight that a collective-action dynamic may arise, 
however, applies even if agencies are separated from the White House. See infra Section V.C. 
127 See, e.g., Blackman, supra note !, at %$#-$' (discussing President Obama’s use of deferred actions 
when Congress decided to not enact an immigration reform bill); Kagan, supra note !%&, at %%'" 
(“Whether the subject was health care, welfare reform, tobacco, or guns, a self-conscious and central 
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enforce the major questions doctrine, presidents will have less ability to create 
major policies through regulation. So if the Court backs away from the doctrine, 
presidents will have a freer hand to create major policies. The shared premise 
may also be true for policies that are neither major nor minor but are regularly 
addressed by policymakers (even if not on the front page). 
The shared premise is not necessarily true, however, for minor questions. 
Minor questions—that is, low-pro+le, often bipartisan issues that the political 
branches want resolved the same way but are not high priorities for either 
branch—are particularly at risk of policy stagnation. As Mancur Olson 
observed, because of the collective-action dynamics that a shared ability to 
act creates, “[i]t is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their 
self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested 
behavior.”#$*F128 Because these characteristics tend to reduce political saliency, 
moreover, the risk of inaction should be especially pronounced where a 
policy’s bene+ts are di,use and its costs concentrated or where a policy is 
technical. For such low-salience, “good government”-type issues, which are 
everywhere in modern society, Congress and the White House both face 
incentives to freeride. This unexplored collective-action insight explains why 
a minor questions doctrine may be worthwhile. 
A. An Intuitive Explanation 
When both political branches share the same policymaking space, each 
branch has an incentive to freeride o, the e,orts of the other. The result for 
each branch may be mixed strategies—i.e., acting only a certain percentage 
of the time.#$+F129 When each branch uses a mixed strategy, sometimes both will 
act, sometimes only one will act, and sometimes neither will act. That 
collective-action insight may apply to administrative law, where shared 
policymaking spaces are common. For certain popular policies, both Congress 
and the White House want to act and would do so regardless of what the 
other does; when that happens, there may be wasted resources (itself a 
collective-action problem), but at least there is no danger of inaction. For 
other policies, however, Congress and the White House both want the same 
thing, but each would prefer the other to bear the costs. In theory, this 
incentive structure might lead to both sides using mixed strategies, and so 
sometimes mutual inaction.#%!F130 
 
object of the [Clinton] White House was to devise, direct, and/or finally announce administrative actions 
. . . to showcase and advance presidential policies [against the backdrop of a hostile Congress].”). 
128 OLSON, supra note !(', at !-% (emphasis omitted). 
129 BAIRD ET AL., supra note !(%, at #&-#+. 
130 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at +(+-(" (discussing a possible example of the President and 
Congress adopting mixed strategies for raising additional revenues). 
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By de+nition, deference allows the White House to act where it would 
otherwise be forced to stand aside, thus expanding the White House’s menu 
of options. At the same time, because agencies (generally) cannot act without 
congressional authorization,#%#F131 and because one Congress cannot bind a 
future Congress,#%$F132 Congress also can access that same menu, plus any other 
policy within its constitutional powers. Thus, every policy that the White 
House can create via Chevron can also be created by Congress through 
legislation. Deference accordingly creates overlapping policy spaces between 
Congress and the White House where such overlap would not otherwise exist. 
This may lead to at least two types of collective-action problems. First, 
sometimes both Congress and the White House may act, resulting in wasted 
resources. And second, sometimes neither Congress nor the White House 
may act, resulting in policy stagnation. 
First, overlapping policymaking power sometimes may mean wasted 
resources. Some policies are good for the public and popular; everyone wants 
credit for those policies. Congress thus may rush to enact legislation, and the 
White House may similarly use its rulemaking powers, augmented by 
Chevron, to create redundant policy.#%%F133 To be sure, this overlapping authority 
 
131 See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, '+& U.S. #**, #+' (!$"&) (“[A]n agency literally has no 
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). The exception to this “no power 
to act” rule, of course, is when the President is acting pursuant to his or her Article II powers. The 
extent of the White House’s power to control what agencies do with delegated authority from 
Congress is disputed, especially when it comes to policymaking authority that only exists because 
Congress created agencies to exercise it. Recently, the Supreme Court suggested that with limited 
exceptions, the President has the constitutional power to control whatever policymaking discretion 
federal agencies enjoy. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, !'( S. Ct. %!"#, %!$+ 
(%(%() (explaining that “[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone,” and that 
although “lesser executive o.cers [may] ‘assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of 
his trust,’” “[t]hese lesser o.cers must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they 
wield” (quoting #( THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON ##' (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
!$#$))); id. at %%(' (explaining that it is important that agencies fall “in line with the President’s 
preferred policies”). That broad view of presidential power, however, is contested. See, e.g., id. at 
%%%+ (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The President, as to the construction of his own branch of government, 
can only try to work his will through the legislative process.”). For purposes of this Article, it is 
enough to observe that the White House can and often does exert a great deal of pressure on agencies 
to pursue the president’s policy goals. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note !%&, at %%'" (demonstrating that in 
recent decades “the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies” has become “more and more 
an extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda”). 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., *!" U.S. "#$, "+% (!$$&) (“[O]ne legislature may not 
bind the legislative authority of its successors.” (citing ! WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *$( (!+&*))). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, !!! YALE L.J. !&&*, !&$# (%((%) (offering some counterexamples). 
133 There are examples of overlapping e)orts. Agencies, for instance, parrot statutory language, 
even though they receive no special deference for doing so. See, e.g., Hanah Metchis Volokh, The 
Anti-Parroting Canon, & N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY %$(, %$( (%(!!) (noting how agencies sometimes 
promulgate rules that parrot statutory language). One explanation may be that the policy is popular. 
Promulgating redundant language allows agencies to “hold [themselves] out as the source of a 
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may have have o,setting bene+ts.#%&F134 And no doubt, there are policies that are 
viewed di,erently by Congress and the White House such that only one 
branch wants to act.#%'F135 But for policies that are perceived as bene+cial and 
popular by both branches, we should expect overlapping policymaking 
authority to produce at least some waste. 
Second, and the special focus of this Article, overlapping policymaking 
power also sometimes may lead to no one doing anything. In deciding 
whether to enact legislation, there are policies for which Congress’s decision 
whether to move forward is a close one—the universe of costs is almost as 
large as the universe of bene+ts, with both “costs” and “bene+ts” being 
comprised of a combination of general welfare concerns mixed with political 
concerns.#%(F136 And within that universe of policies, sometimes the overall 
bene+ts come disproportionately from the welfare side of the ledger, while 
the overall costs are disproportionately political. When a welfare-enhancing 
policy is politically popular, Congress is eager to act. But when a welfare-
enhancing policy is politically costly, Congress presumably would like to see 
someone else step up, at least at the margins.#%)F137 Likewise, even if a policy is 
politically bene+cial, it can still be very costly to enact—it takes resources to 
address some issues and opportunity costs are real. This is especially true for 
technical issues, which tend to require more policymaking resources to 
understand and address.#%*F138 Where such costs become great enough, the 
 
popular new law, just as legislators may enact redundant laws to play to interest groups.” F. Andrew 
Hessick, Doctrinal Redundancies, &+ ALA. L. REV. &#*, &&$ n.!+* (%(!&) (citing Michael Doran, 
Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, $! B.U. L. REV. !"!*, !"'' (%(!!)). 
134 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, !%* 
HARV. L. REV. !!#!, !!#" (%(!%) (“[R]edundancy has certain bene,ts, like providing a form of 
insurance against a single agency’s failure.”); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency 
Adjudication, !%" HARV. L. REV. "(*, "'" (%(!*) (similar). 
135 As re-ected in the major questions doctrine, however, there may be questions of legitimacy 
when the White House creates such policies. See supra notes "(–"* and accompanying text. 
136 Further complicating the analysis, these welfare and political costs and benefits overlap. 
Members of Congress are themselves part of the public, so they benefit when the public benefits, and 
they suffer when the public suffers. Likewise, political survival for a member of Congress may potentially 
be a means and not an end; if so, a decision driven by political survival could also, at bottom, be driven 
by public-interest motivations. For ease of exposition, however, this overlap will be set aside. 
137 Cf., e.g., OSTROM, supra note $' (explaining the “powerful” argument that “[w]henever one 
person cannot be excluded from the bene,ts that others provide . . . [t]he temptation to free-ride 
. . . may dominate the decision process”). 
138 Congress, of course, could increase its policymaking capacity by hiring more sta) or by 
borrowing technical expertise from agencies. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An 
Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, "* GEO. WASH. L. REV. '*!, '$" 
(%(!+) (explaining that Congress uses agencies to help draft statutes because “[a]gencies have more 
sta) and greater subject-matter expertise”). There may be limits, however, to Congress’ ability to 
hire more sta). See, e.g., Ruth Bloch Rubin, Lessons from the History of Reform, in CONGRESS 
OVERWHELMED: THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
%**, %&& (Timothy M. LaPira, Lee Drutman & Kevin R. Kosar eds., %(%() (noting political obstacles 
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political bene+ts of acting may be canceled out such that Congress again 
presumably would also like someone else to take the lead. Delegated 
authority, express and implicit (via Chevron), may allow that “someone else” 
dynamic to emerge. Congress, acting rationally from its perspective, may 
prefer the White House to create the policy. 
Yet the White House may not be eager to accept that role.#%+F139 Even if it 
agrees that the policy is welfare-enhancing, the White House surely 
recognizes the asymmetrical costs.#&!F140 Granted, if Congress could not act, the 
White House might be willing to go it alone.#&#F141 But Congress can act. And if 
it does, the White House bene+ts because the policy becomes law on 
Congress’s tab. Thus, the White House may also be tempted to freeride, 
especially if it believes Congress is shirking.#&$F142 This shared incentive to 
freeride is critical because, again, when playing the Chicken Game, 
sometimes no one turns.#&%F143 Deference thus may have two e,ects—the 
intended e,ect (more unilateral White House action for some policies) and 
the unintended one (less overall federal action for other policies). 
Think of it this way. Imagine you’re a member of Congress. There are 
certain policies that are high priorities for you. You are going to do whatever 
you can to get those done no matter what anyone else does. Let’s call those 
policies !, #, and (. But you only have so much time in the day. There are 
other policies that are more marginal but that you want and would push if 
you had time. Let’s call those policies !", !%, and #'. And then there are a 
spread of !) other policies in between. When policies !" to #' can be done by 
 
to increased sta.ng); Thomas Molnar Fisher, Republican Constitutional Skepticism and Congressional 
Reform, &$ IND. L.J. !%!*, !%'& (!$$#) (explaining the arguments that “sta) expansion undermines 
Congress’ ability to deliberate” and decreases “accountability”). Members of Congress, moreover, 
may not always trust agency experts. See Shobe, supra, at '+& n."#, *(". In any event, regardless of 
capacity, it also takes initiative to get the policymaking ball rolling in the ,rst place, and both sides 
may be reluctant to take that initial step because of their hope that the other will. 
139 See Louis L. Ja)e, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, "& HARV. L. REV. !!"#, !!$' (!$+#) 
(“[O]ne of the consequences of broad delegation will be the indisposition of the agency to decide 
controversial questions.”). 
140 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at &'# (“All else equal, the President would prefer to share 
the political costs of raising revenue with Congress, while Congress would prefer that the President 
bear all the political costs of raising revenue himself.”). 
141 See id. at &'' (predicting more unilateral action by the White House when Congress is 
divided because the White House knows that Congress is less able to bring about policy). 
142 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, &# U. CHI. L. REV. *$!, &(' (!$$&) 
(explaining how a “desire not to be suckered” may in-uence behavior (quoting Peter H. Huang & 
Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 
!( J.L. ECON. & ORG. #$(, '(# (!$$'))). 
143 See, e.g., David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing 
Default Rules for Budgets, "& U. COLO. L. REV. !"!, %(& (%(!*) (likening budget negotiations to 
Chicken Games where shutdowns sometimes happen); Hemel, supra note !%, at &'' (“Absent the 
possibility of such credible commitments, . . . some revenue-raising measures that could be 
implemented via regulation or via legislation may not be implemented at all.”). 
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someone else, you are less inclined to do them yourself. That “someone else,” 
however, may have a similar approach. If that “someone else” views the same 
policies as marginal that you do, both of you and the “someone else” may 
stand aside in hopes that the other person acts. Instead, both you and the 
“someone else” may spend time replicating each other’s work on policies !, #, 
and (. The result would be a net loss to society. 
Importantly, what types of policies may be most susceptible to mutual 
inaction? In other words, what policies exist for which, from a policymaker’s 
perspective, the total bene+ts outweigh the total costs, but with the bene+ts 
disproportionately coming from general welfare considerations, and the costs 
disproportionately coming from political considerations or high opportunity 
costs? Obvious answers include (i) policies for which the welfare bene+ts are 
di,use but the political costs are concentrated and (ii) policies that are 
technical and so require more of the actor’s resources to address.#&&F144 The 
former category should be especially vulnerable to collect-action dynamics 
because it is easier for concentrated groups to mobilize, thus putting political 
pressure on policymakers.#&'F145 Classic examples include industry-speci+c 
subsidies or tax breaks; there is little bene+t to any individual voter, but these 
policies can be the di,erence between survival and extinction for businesses 
in the industries.#&(F146 And as for the latter category, it is easy to imagine 
technical issues that would require many resources to solve and so, all else 
being equal, are more likely to go unaddressed.#&)F147 
The result is that in a world with deference, we should not be surprised 
to see cases—at the margins—where Congress and the White House do not 
act, even though either branch would act if policymaking power was not 
shared.#&*F148 Importantly, although major questions or intermediate questions 
can also sometimes be subject to such collective-action dynamics because they 
 
144 Cf. Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, "! FORDHAM L. REV. 
%&"#, %&$& (%(!#) (“Interest group theory from political science . . . [contends] that how a law 
distributes its costs and bene,ts determines how easy that law is to pass and to sustain.”). 
145 See id. at %&$+ (“[S]ome small, easily organized group will bene,t and thus has a powerful 
incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the bene,t are distributed at a low per capita rate over 
a large number of people, and hence they have little incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed, 
they even hear of the policy.” (quoting Wilson, supra note !&, at #&$)). 
146 Id. at %&"&; see also Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 
&& U. CHI. L. REV. !, #! (!$$$) (“Modest bene,ts to a well-organized interest group can readily 
outweigh larger costs to a di)use and poorly organized interest group in the political calculus.”). 
147 Cf., e.g., Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to 
Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, !% J. TECH. L. & POL’Y !+$, !$!-$% (%((+) (explaining how 
“research and development” is subject to “collective action problems” unless the bene,ts are 
“internalized”); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, *% DUKE L.J. &"#, +(% (%((#) 
(noting that what is “expensive to produce” can lead to “a real freerider problem”). 
148 See Hemel, supra note !%, at +!! (“A zero-deference regime would e)ectively eliminate the 
President’s regulatory option, increasing the probability that Congress would act.”). 
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too can be characterized by di,use bene+ts and concentrated costs or unusual 
technical complexity, policies with those particular characteristics should 
more regularly satisfy this Article’s de+nition of a minor question. 
B. A Mathematical Explanation 
The foregoing intuitive analysis also +nds support in game theory. Game 
theory teaches that because of mixed strategies,#&+F149 sometimes the 
consequence of shared policymaking spaces is that nothing happens. 
This point is best illustrated by a number of variations of the Snowdrift 
Game.#'!F150 Recall, in this game there are two drivers who run into a snowdrift 
from opposite sides. Each would bene+t from a clear road. Sometimes the 
costs and bene+ts of clearing the road are such that both will happily clear 
the snow, especially if shoveling snow is fun. Other times both will get out of 
the car, resulting in redundancy. Other times still, no one will shovel. 
Consider the following version of the game. Imagine that shoveling is easy 
and fast (essentially, all the work is done by getting out of the car) and it is 
rewarding too (because, say, it is good exercise). If so, the payo, matrix (i.e., 
 
149 Some may object to the use of mixed strategies. After all, when it comes to politics, no one 
is randomly pulling cards from a hat that say “act” or “don’t act,” and mixed strategies may require 
some “random device to decide upon an action.” ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND 
LANGUAGE: FIVE ESSAYS ++-+" (%((!); see also Tonja Jacobi & Jonah Kind, Criminal Innovation and 
the Warrant Requirement: Reconsidering the Rights-Police E+ciency Trade-O%, *& WM. & MARY L. REV. 
+*$, "(( n.!$* (%(!*) (“Some scholars have argued that Nash equilibria are not in fact accurate 
predictions of human behavior.”). It can also be di.cult to model a relationship that may result in 
multiple, even in,nite, iterations of the game. See generally Bengt Carlsson & Stefan Johansson, An 
Iterated Hawk-and-Dove Game, in AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS !+$ (Wayne Wobcke, 
Maurice Pagnucco & Chengqi Zhang eds., !$$+). Game theorists have o)ered defenses of mixed 
strategies. See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN, supra, at +$ (“[T]he uncertainties behind the mixed strategy 
equilibrium [can be] viewed as an expression of the lack of certainty on the part of the other players 
rather than an intentional plan of the individual player.”); Robert J. Aumann, What Is Game Theory 
Trying to Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS *, !$ (Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo Honkapohja 
eds., !$"*) (noting that “mixed strategy [can] model[] the ignorance of the outside observer and of 
the other players”). This Article does not address these broad issues. Su.ce it to say, despite 
di.culties, economists have long recognized that mixed-strategy analysis has value. See, e.g., Press 
Release, The Nobel Prize, Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel !$$' (Oct. !!, !$$'), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/!$$'/summary 
[https://perma.cc/*JJB-+#CX] (“Nash equilibrium has become a standard tool in almost all areas of 
economic theory.”). 
150 The portrayal here is stylized. In reality, a lot of behavior occurs before a mixed-strategy-
randomizing-like approach applies. Individuals speak with each other and monitor what the other 
one is doing. Only after a lot of back and forth do the parties decide to “act” versus “non-act.” My 
model necessarily assumes all of that as background. The central point is that at least some cases, at 
the margins, it is useful to model parties with overlapping policymaking authority acting in a way 
that re-ects mixed-strategy analysis. Put di)erently, “all models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE 
SURFACES '%' (!$"+). 
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how happy a player in the game is about a particular outcome)#'#F151 could look 
something like this: 
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Here, it is impossible to end up in a situation where no one shovels. Both 
players want to shovel. If, for some reason, one player does not shovel, that 
wouldn’t change anything for the other player. Both sides thus have what is 
called a “dominant” strategy.#'$F152 When it comes to policymaking, this version 
of the Snowdrift game may be akin to a situation where the policy is welfare 
enhancing, popular, and not overly technical. For such policies, both Congress 
and the White House will try to bring them about no matter what the other 
does. Although mutual action has deadweight losses too, it does not lead to a 
welfare-enhancing policy being thwarted.#'%F153 
Now, however, consider a di,erent version of the game. Here, it is very 
cold, and whatever reward that comes from helping others is more than o,set 
by the joy of a warm car. Yet sitting in a car too long means illness or even 
death. With this scenario in place, imagine these payo,s: 
 
 
151 See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Essay, Induced Litigation, $" NW. U. L. REV. 
*'*, *'$ n.!# (%((') (“[T]he concept of ‘utility’ [i]s a means of assigning an objective score to the 
relative level of satisfaction that a person gets from consuming a good or undertaking an activity.” 
(citing ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS +# (*th ed. %((!))). 
152 See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note !(%, at !! (describing the role of each player’s dominant 
strategy in game theory). The dominant strategy arises because driver one considers the scenario 
where driver two shovels. In that case, driver one maximizes her utility by shoveling (, > $). Driver 
one then considers the scenario where driver two does not shovel; in that case, driver one maximizes 
her utility by shoveling (& > -&). No matter which choice driver two makes, driver one will be better 
o) shoveling. The same analysis will be conducted by driver two, with the same result, so both 
parties will shovel. Note, there is no need for symmetry. This Article uses symmetrical values for 
simplicity’s sake. But the same outcome would emerge if, say, one of the *s was replaced with an ", 
and one of the -*s was replaced with a -!. All that matters is certain values in the matrix are larger 
than other values. 
153 To be clear, though: At the margins, there may be policies that are on net bene,cial only if 
just one branch incurs the expense of bringing them about. 
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There is no dominant strategy here. If Driver One shovels, Driver Two is 
better o, staying in the car. If Driver Two shovels, Driver One is better o, 
staying in the car. Yet if they both stay in the car, both will su,er.#'&F154 What 
happens? It is impossible to say. But both sides may opt to use a mixed 
strategy. With a certain probability, each Driver could decide to shovel, and, 
inversely, also decide not to shovel. This probability, moreover, can be derived 
mathematically.#''F155 It turns out that Driver One and Driver Two should each 
shovel about %"% of the time and not shovel #% of the time. The probability 
that neither shovels therefore would be less than !%.#'(F156 This is reassuring. 
There may be some redundancy, but at least someone will almost certainly do 
the work. As to policymaking, this may be a situation where the policy is 
welfare enhancing but either unpopular or unusually technical, but where 
mutual inaction is deemed catastrophic. 
 
154 There are thus two “pure strategy” Nash equilibria; if Driver One shovels, Driver Two 
always stays in the car; if Driver Two shovels, Driver One always stays in the car. See BAIRD ET AL., 
supra note !(%, at #*. Again, symmetrical numbers are not essential for this analysis. Notably, some 
might ,ght the hypothetical and ask why the two drivers don’t just get out of their cars and make a 
deal. At the margins, transaction costs could keep that from happening. In the Snowdrift Game, the 
wall of snow, the bitter cold, etc., could be transaction costs, as could the inability to guarantee that 
the other driver will actually get out of the car and shovel when it is his turn. The analogous costs 
may be far higher in government, where politics, personal grudges, and the inability to know what 
the courts will do all can be transaction costs. See generally Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, !+ 
GREEN BAG %D !'! (%(!'). 
155 Player One’s optimal strategy is determined by choosing the value for P! (given Player Two’s 
optimal strategy (P")) that maximizes Player One’s expected payout, that is, Player One chooses P! 
to maximize the following payout: P! [P"(!) - (!-P")(,)] - (!-P!) [P"($) - (!-P")(-&$)]. 
Player Two solves an identical equation. With a bit of algebra (and a little bit of calculus), we 
see that P".P!.&$/&! or about $"%. See also BAIRD ET AL., supra note !(%, at #*-#" & %++ n.!& 
(describing the math algebraically). 
156 The probability that both would shovel can be calculated by multiplying the probability that 
Driver One would shovel (for simplicity’s sake, say, $"%) by the probability that Driver Two would 
shovel (also, say, $"%). That would be approximately $&%. The probability that neither would shovel 
would be calculated by multiplying the probability that Driver One would not shovel (say, %%) by 
the probability that Driver Two would not shovel (again, say, %%); that is .('%. 
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Things change, however, when the payo, structures changes. Consider 
the following version of the game: 
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Now, using the same formula, the mixed strategy for Driver One and 
Driver Two would be to each shovel half the time. This means that for any 
particular snowstorm, we should expect both to shovel #*% of the time and 
neither to shovel #*% of the time and that one of the two will shovel half of 
the time. Returning to policymaking, this situation could be one where the 
policy is welfare enhancing but politically costly or the issue is very technical, 
and mutual inaction is pretty bad but hardly a catastrophe. 
Finally, if we change the payo, structure one more time, mutual inaction 
can become likely: 
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Here, the optimal strategy for both Driver One and Driver Two is to 
shovel !'% of the time and not shovel %'% of the time. Hence, we should 
expect that no one shovels; indeed, that should happen about "'% of the time. 
In this scenario, even though the worst outcome for everyone is mutual 
inaction, perversely, that outcome is also what we should expect. Analogizing 
to policymaking, this version may be a situation where the policy is, on net, 
socially bene+cial but the political or opportunity costs of bringing it about 
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are very high and letting nothing happen is not a huge deal. Under these 
conditions, freeriding may be quite attractive. To be clear, both branches 
would bene+t from action because a good policy would become law. 
Accordingly, if only one could act, that branch would do so. But because both 
can act, and the costs of mutual inaction are considered minor, we should 
expect that often nothing happens. 
The upshot is straightforward. For policies for which neither branch has 
a dominant strategy to act, and especially for which neither considers inaction 
catastrophic, mutual inaction sometimes should occur.#')F157 Not by accident, 
those conditions often match the test o,ered in this Article for a minor 
question.#'*F158 If an issue is particularly important to either or both branches, 
then there is a good chance that at least one has a dominant strategy to act. 
Likewise, even if no branch has a dominant strategy to act, but if both 
consider inaction catastrophic, suggesting that the policy is not a minor 
question, the odds of mutual inaction should be small. But if an issue is not 
deemed especially important, then sometimes neither branch may act, even 
though both agree that the policy is welfare-enhancing and either branch 
would if the other one couldn’t. 
C. Real World Applications 
This collective-action dynamic may play out in the real world. To be sure, 
it is di-cult for an academic observer to con+dently identify things that did 
not happen but would have happened if some variable had been di,erent. It 
is also di-cult to understand political decisionmaking, where the reason 
o,ered for an action may not be the real one.#'+F159 The fog surrounding 
policymaking is especially heavy here, moreover, because the sorts of policies 
where inaction results may not command a great deal of attention. And there 
are many reasons that a policy proposal might not become law, even if the 
policy is popular.#(!F160 Despite these limitations, however, this Section 
identi+es substantive areas of law that may be most susceptible to a “minor 
questions” collective-action problem. 
The +rst +eld is tax law. Daniel Hemel observes that there are many 
policies that the White House could bring about to increase federal revenue. 
Yet even though the White House supports these policies—indeed, by means 
 
157 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at +(" (“Two-sided inaction may result . . . even in 
equilibrium.”). As explained above, how Congress and the White House determine the value of 
policy implicates competing theories of governmental behavior. 
158 See supra p. !%('. 
159 See, e.g., Hemel & Nielson, supra note %+, at +""-"(! (o)ering possible examples). 
160 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, *( U. CHI. L. REV. *##, *'+ (!$"#) 
(“Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be 
di.cult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”). 
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of the “Greenbook,” the White House encourages Congress to enact those 
policies by legislation—the White House is unwilling to promulgate 
regulations to do so, even though it could itself unilaterally turn these policies 
into law.#(#F161 Hemel documents a number of statutes for which an agency 
would receive deference, and for which the White House openly favored a 
particular tax policy, yet the White House declined to regulate but instead 
requested Congress to do so. For instance, taxing o-cials, when interpreting 
the phrase “exclusively for conservation purposes” in the tax code, could read 
the statute to prevent taxpayers from claiming massive deductions for “‘air 
rights’ easement[s]” above historic homes where “such development [is] 
already restricted by local authorities.”#($F162 Nonetheless, the White House has 
not acted. Hemel details a number of similarly ambiguous tax-related statutes 
that seem to +t this same pattern.#(%F163 
At +rst blush, this inaction seems puzzling. If the White House thinks a 
revenue-raising rule is in the public interest, and if it has authority under 
Chevron to promulgate such a regulation, why not do it? Yet unilateral action 
by the White House means that it will bear essentially all the costs while only 
receiving some of the bene+ts. That is a recipe for inaction.#(&F164 Moreover, 
applying this Article’s di,used-versus-concentrated framework (i.e., we 
should expect collective-action dynamics more often for issues with di,use 
bene+ts but concentrated costs because they impose greater relative political 
costs on the branch that acts), this is the sort of situation for which inaction 
is most likely; there is a di,use bene+t (increased revenue for the public) but 
a concentrated cost (a particular group must pay more). Likewise, if we focus 
on this Article’s simple-versus-technical framework (i.e., we should expect 
collective-action dynamics more often for technical issues that require the 
acting branch to use more resources to address), it is also easy to see why 
complicated tax issues are not readily addressed. Accordingly, Hemel’s 
speci+c, real-world examples support the thesis that deference sometimes 
may create a collective-action problem for revenue collection. 
 
161 See Hemel, supra note !%, at &#$-'( (“Almost invariably, the Greenbook includes proposals 
that the President plausibly could carry out on his own—without any congressional action—by 
directing the Treasury Department to promulgate appropriate regulations.”); see also id. (listing 
examples). 
162 See id. at &+!-+% (,rst quoting %& I.R.C. § !+((h)(!)(C); then quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR %(!' REVENUE 
PROPOSALS !&% (%(!#)). 
163 See Hemel, supra note !%, at &*"-+*. 
164 See id. at +(#-(' (“[E]ven if the shared political bene,ts of additional spending are high 
enough that the President would be willing to bear the political costs of raising revenue on his own, 
he would still prefer to share those costs with Congress. As a result, the President may include 
proposals in the Greenbook even though—if the prospect of legislation were o) the table—the 
President would be willing to implement the proposal via executive action.”). 
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Hemel’s logic, however, can be taken further. His article, The President’s 
Power to Tax, focuses on one half of the dynamic: why the White House acts or 
does not act. But his analysis also explains Congress’s Power to Tax. Hemel notes 
in passing—but does not dwell on the troubling possibility—that because of 
deference, Congress may also decline to act, resulting in welfare-enhancing 
policies being shelved even though both Congress and the White House would 
turn them into law but for the fact that the other also could do so.#('F165 For 
instance, Hemel observes that “the rise of the anti-tax Tea Party in recent years 
may actually have led to more revenue being raised” because Congress was 
effectively disabled from acting, thus allowing “the President and Congress to 
avoid the uncooperative result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate).”#((F166 But the flipside 
is that when the White House and Congress do agree on the policy, “the 
uncooperative result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate),” may emerge in a world with 
shared policymaking space. When only the White House can act, there is no 
collective-action problem because there is no temptation to freeride. By the 
same token though, when only Congress can act, there is also no collective-action 
problem. It is only when both branches can act that the dynamic emerges. The 
specific examples Hemel offers of tax policies that the White House lists in the 
Greenbook but that Congress does not enact are thus situations in which 
deference’s collective-action dynamics may be working its mischief. The fact that 
Congress declines to enact legislation that the White House favors, even though 
there is reason to think that Congress also favors it (for instance, say, when the 
White House and a supermajority of Congress were controlled by the same 
party#()F167), is notable. 
Hemel’s tax examples, moreover, do not fully capture the “minor questions” 
problem. There are different types of tax issues.#(*F168 Some “loopholes,” for 
instance, are actually deliberate choices by policymakers, often with partisan 
overtones.#(+F169 Others, however, are minor questions that the majority of 
policymakers irrespective of party affiliation would address in the same way if it 
 
165 See Hemel, supra note !%, at &''-'* (“[Deference] empowered the executive branch to act 
unilaterally, but it also may have discouraged Congress from raising revenue via legislation.”). 
166 Id. at +!(. 
167 Deference in tax policy is complicated by the fact that it was not until %(!! that the Supreme 
Court explicitly held that Chevron applies in the tax context. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & 
Rsch. v. United States, *&% U.S. '', *#-*+ (%(!!). Before %(!!, courts sometimes applied Chevron, 
but on other occasions applied less robust forms of deference. See Hemel, supra note !%, at &** 
(discussing Nat’l Mu/er Dealers Ass’n v. United States, ''( U.S. '+%, '++ (!$+$)). By %(!!, the 
Democrats’ supermajority was gone. Because at least some deference existed both before and after 
%(!!, this fact does not defeat the analysis, but it does complicate the math. 
168 See generally Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy of Tax Loopholes, ** HOUS. L. REV. *'* (%(!") 
(explaining the di)erent types of policies that are all labeled “loopholes”). 
169 See Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor’s Toesies: A “Roguish” Concurrence with Professor 
Baxter, *& LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. '*, &%-&# (!$$#) (“[S]ome ‘loopholes’ actually re-ect 
deliberate choices or compromises by Congress.”). 
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were relatively easy to do so. Hemel’s point that divided government may 
mitigate collective-action problems makes more sense for partisan issues where 
a divided Congress de facto means that if the White House wants the policy, it 
has to act. But technical issues without partisan implications may be particularly 
susceptible to stagnation (again at the margins) because there is no obvious 
reason why divided government would prevent congressional action for a 
bipartisan issue. In other words, perversely, the less controversial the policy, the 
stronger the collective-action problem, all else being equal. This is why minor 
questions (uncontroversial issues with low salience) may be disproportionately 
affected by deference’s collective-action dynamics. 
Hemel’s tax analysis is quite useful because—thanks to the Greenbook—
it contains concrete examples. Because few areas of law have a tool like the 
Greenbook, it is more di-cult to identify speci+c policies that the Executive 
Branch favors yet does not act on. But it is possible to identify other subjects 
where the same dynamics that a,ect tax law may apply. 
For instance, international trade is another area marked by di,used 
bene+ts, concentrated costs, and technical complexity.#)!F170 Revising tari,s or 
subsidies, therefore, is another place where deference sometimes may negate 
the emergence of bene+cial policy. To the extent that the statute is 
ambiguous,#)#F171 both Congress and the White House sometimes can bene+t the 
public by revising tari,s or subsidies. Yet +guring out optimal policy on a 
product-by-product basis is technical and potentially politically costly; reform 
will anger a concentrated group (resulting in, say, political advertising against 
the policymaker).#)$F172 Although the White House often has broad authority 
over trade issues (in part, the theory goes, because it less susceptible to 
factionalism#)%F173), it is easy to see why the White House at times may be 
reluctant to use this authority, especially when doing so will a,ect a 
concentrated industry. This pattern is consistent with the notion that when 
an overall welfare-enhancing policy becomes su-ciently costly for the acting 
 
170 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 
!!' HARV. L. REV. *!!, *!& (%((() (noting how protectionist interest groups “ostensibly” seeking to 
serve public goals may just want to prevent foreign competition). These dynamics have been 
understood since the time of Adam Smith—who also could not mobilize the public to address them. 
See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, $( MICH. L. REV. "$*, 
$#! n.!!$ (!$$%) (citing ! ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS '*(-&$ (R.H. Campbell et al. 
eds., Clarendon Press !$+&) (!++&)). 
171 For reasons sounding in “step zero,” Chevron does not apply to every trade decision. See, 
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., *## U.S. %!" (%((!). Chevron, however, does apply to some trade 
decisions. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, "($ F.#d !#%(, !#%' (Fed. Cir. %(!&). 
172 See generally RÉAL P. LAVERGNE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. TARIFFS: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS !#%-#* (!$"#) (describing the extent to which tari) structure “responds to 
interest-group pressure as opposed to the ‘public interest’”). 
173 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note !+(, at *#$-'!. 
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branch, neither branch wants to take the lead, even if it approves of the policy 
and would not stand in the way if the other wanted to act. 
Similar analysis may apply to providing access to information. Again, the 
issue can be technical, the bene+t is di,use, and the costs may be concentrated 
if disclosure is embarrassing to a speci+c group.#)&F174 
Environmental law may also be worth considering. Many environmental 
law scholars lament the fact that environmental proposals are hard to turn 
into law because of concentrated costs and di,use bene+ts.#)'F175 They also 
observe that Congress may be reluctant to address technical issues.#)(F176 
Accordingly, environmental law may be another +eld where the collective-
action dynamic created by deference sometimes leads to some inaction.#))F177 
Granted, many environmental policies are not “minor” questions; indeed, 
they may even be “major” ones. But there are also many smaller, lower-pro+le 
questions without partisan overtones. 
These categories are not meant to be exhaustive, nor—to be clear—is it 
certain that these categories are subject to stagnation of the sort discussed in 
this Article. Indeed, it would be useful for subject-matter experts to study 
collective-action dynamics in greater detail to help identify speci+c examples 
of stagnation (as with the Greenbook in tax). And, to be sure, it may be good 
that some policies are thwarted. This Article is not the place for a discussion 
of the merits of any particular issue. Instead, the point here is that that even 
when both Congress and the White House want the same thing, sometimes 
nothing may get done. 
 
174 Cf. Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive In'uence in 
Political Institutions, "" MICH. L. REV. $!+, $#% (!$$() (“[O]btaining information is more costly for 
di)use groups.”). 
175 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental 
Standards, "$ N.Y.U. L. REV. !!"', !%*' n.'(! (%(!') (“[I]ndividuals that favor cleaner air, will have 
di.culty in-uencing government decisionmaking compared to well-organized, concentrated 
groups.”); see also id. (collecting citations). 
176 See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to 
Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, "* KY. L.J. "(#, "#( (!$$+) (noting congressional 
reluctance to address “technical” issues). 
177 Consider, for example, environmental policy in the !$$(s. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, !!* HARV. L. REV. **#, &##-#& (%((!) (examining 
environmental law in the !$$(s and noting that Congress did not enact major legislation for a good 
portion of the decade even when Democrats controlled both the White House and Congress); Paul 
Rauber, Bill Clinton: Does He Deserve Your Vote?, SIERRA MAG., https://vault.sierraclub.org/ 
sierra/!$$&($/clinton.asp (last visited May !, %(%!) [https://perma.cc/D*&J-D&AA] (bemoaning that “a 
nominally green White House and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress” failed to enact 
legislation and, further, that the White House failed to use its regulatory powers to their fullest). To be 
sure, this Article does not claim that this experience is an example of a collective-action problem, much 
less an example of the sort of collective-action problem addressed here (indeed, Congress did address 
some “narrow technical issues,” Revesz, supra, at &#')—the political process is too complicated. But it is 
worth thinking about surprising periods of inaction. 
!#!" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !!"! 
IV. THE MINOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 
For reasons explained, minor questions present special concerns that the 
Chevron framework does not address. Congress can +x this problem and the 
Supreme Court potentially can too.#)*F178 And because the problem is structural, 
it is doubtful that the problem will solve itself. A minor question doctrine 
thus could be valuable. 
The question, however, is what a minor questions doctrine should entail. 
There are at least three possibilities. The +rst version would mimic the major 
questions doctrine: just as courts do not defer when major questions are 
implicated, they also would not defer when minor questions are implicated. 
The second version would take a di,erent tack. Rather than courts themselves 
directly addressing minor questions, agencies would have discretion to 
prospectively waive Chevron. The third version would reverse the Chevron 
presumption; agencies would only receive deference when Congress expressly 
delegates the power. Each of these solutions has pluses and minuses, but the 
key point is that any of them would reduce overlapping policymaking 
authority for minor questions. 
A. Mirroring the Major Questions Doctrine 
The most obvious path to a minor questions doctrine is to borrow from the 
major questions doctrine. Just as courts do not defer in cases with major 
questions, they could also not defer in cases with minor ones. And because 
Congress would know ex ante#)+F179 that courts would not defer when a minor 
question is involved, Congress would also know that only it could create the 
policy—thus defeating (or at least mitigating) the collective-action problem.#*!F180 
Unfortunately, revising the Chevron framework this way is easier said than 
done. First, the concern here is governmental inaction. It is easy to see how a 
court would be presented with a major-question case; a party would challenge 
 
178 Whether the Supreme Court can address this collective-action problem implicates a question 
of stare decisis beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, to the extent that Chevron is a species 
of “common law,” Sohoni, supra note +, at !'#+, the Court may have a freer hand to modify Chevron—as, 
indeed, it has done with the major questions doctrine. The minor question doctrine would also address 
an unintended consequence of the Court’s own making, which may further counsel in favor of judicial 
reform. The Court’s “precedent on precedent” may also allow some revision of deference doctrines 
without offending stare decisis. See Hickman & Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, supra note **, at 
$$%. Here, however, identifying how stare decisis works is orthogonal to this Article’s point. Whether or 
not the Court can fix Chevron, Congress can. (This prompts the question why Congress has not done so 
already. More on that below. See infra Section V.B.) 
179 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, "" YALE L.J. $*( (!$+$) (explaining that would-be litigants often do not need to go court 
precisely because they know ex ante what a court would do). 
180 See Hemel, supra note !%, at +!( (explaining how obstacles to congressional action make 
presidential action more likely by defeating a collective-action problem). 
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what the agency did, the agency would defend itself by citing Chevron, and a 
court would decide whether deference is appropriate. But how can a court 
address something that hasn’t happened? Typically, a party can only challenge 
final agency action#*#F181—not an agency rule that is merely in process of being 
finished,#*$F182 and certainly not a rule that the agency has not even started. True, 
parties can sometimes petition for a rulemaking.#*%F183 But judicial review of agency 
denials of such petitions is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.”#*&F184 
This version of the minor questions thus would have to address the “where 
will the cases come from?” issue. It could so in a couple of ways. Congress 
could reduce agency discretion over petitions for rulemaking, at least when 
minor questions are in play.#*'F185 This would have to be done carefully because 
agencies often have good reasons to not grant a petition for rulemaking that 
have nothing to do with collective-action dynamics.#*(F186 The other approach 
would be to reduce Chevron’s domain organically where minor questions are 
involved. This could be done by relaxing the Brand X doctrine.#*)F187 Either 
Congress or the Supreme Court could decree that when a minor question is 
at issue, a judicial interpretation will control despite any later acts by the 
agency. In this way, courts could sometimes de+nitively interpret agency-
 
181 * U.S.C. § +('; see Bennett v. Spear, *%( U.S. !*', !++-+" (!$$+) (“[T]he action must mark 
the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process . . . it must not be of a merely tentative 
or interlocutory nature.”). 
182 See, e.g., In re Murray Energy Corp., +"" F.#d ##(, ##' (D.C. Cir. %(!*) (“[A] proposed rule 
is just a proposal. In justiciable cases, this Court has authority to review the legality of ,nal agency 
rules. We do not have authority to review proposed agency rules.”). 
183 * U.S.C. § **#(e). 
184 Massachusetts v. EPA, *'$ U.S. '$+, *%+-%" (%((+) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & 
Forwarders Assn. of Am., Inc. v. United States, ""# F.%d $#, $& (D.C. Cir. !$"$)). 
185 The judiciary could not do this; the standard for review of denials of petitions for 
rulemaking is a question of statutory law. See * U.S.C. § +(&; cf. Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme 
Court’s Quiet Revolution: Rede)ning the Meaning of Jurisdiction, *& WM. & MARY L. REV. %(%+, %(%+ 
(%(!*) (faulting the Court for creating doctrines divorced from the law). That said, as part of 
arbitrary-and-capricious review, perhaps a court could require an agency to explain itself if a party 
alleges that a collective-action problem is thwarting policy. Presumably an agency could easily defeat 
that sort of argument, though, by pointing to resource constraints. 
186 See, e.g., Massachusetts, *'$ U.S. at *%+ (“As we have repeated time and again, an agency has 
broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its 
delegated responsibilities.”). 
187 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., *'* U.S. $&+, $&$ (%((*) 
(holding that under the logic of Chevron, an agency can override a court’s prior interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute); see also Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency 
Commitments, &( VAND. L. REV. !(%!, !(**-*& (%((+) (explaining how Brand X reduces an agency’s 
ability to make credible commitments not to act). There are arguments against doing this (e.g., 
doctrinal coherence) that do not sound in collective-action concerns. The point here is simply that 
this sort of reform could address the “where will the cases come from?” issue. The overall value of 
this sort of reform is a more complicated question. 
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administered statutes, which over time would limit the amount of overlapping 
policymaking space,#**F188 and so the collective-action problem. 
The second problem with this version of the minor questions doctrine goes 
to administrability. Determining whether a policy has, say, “vast ‘economic and 
political significance’”#*+F189 is not easy.#+!F190 But surely it is easier than directly 
targeting minor questions. The number of false positives would be significant—
as would be the risk of judicial micromanagement. Perhaps more manageably, 
this version of the minor questions doctrine thus could identify categories of 
policies that are most susceptible to a collective-action problem. Although such 
categories would inevitably be under- and overinclusive,#+#F191 a category-by-
category approach presumably would be more administrable than an issue-by-
issue approach. 
B. A New Form of Chevron Waiver 
Agencies could also be allowed to waive deference for certain policies. 
Judges thus would not decide what is a minor question. Instead, agencies 
themselves would have an o,-ramp to escape a collective-action problem 
where agencies, not courts, conclude that turning o, Chevron would be 
worthwhile. Allowing agencies to identify where collective-action problems 
exist should be much more judicially administrable. 
The idea behind this version of the minor questions doctrine comes from 
the collective-action literature. One solution to the Chicken Game is for a 
player to openly and irrevocably toss aside its steering wheel.#+$F192 Applied to 
administrative law, that insight cuts in favor of allowing regulators to “turn 
o,” Chevron. If an agency can credibly claim that it lacks authority to create 
a policy, then the collective-action problem disappears.#+%F193 In other aspects of 
administrative law, the judiciary acts as a credible commitment mechanism 
 
188 See Masur, supra note !"+, at !(#+-'! (explaining how Brand X reduces legal stability). 
189 Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, *+# U.S. #(%, #%' (%(!') (quoting FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., *%$ U.S. !%(, !*$-&( (%((()). 
190 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, "** F.#d #"!, '%# (D.C. Cir. %(!+) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[D]etermining whether a rule constitutes a major 
rule sometimes has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality. So there inevitably will be close cases 
and debates at the margins about whether a rule quali,es as major.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 
*, at '* (similar). 
191 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossi)cation, "& GEO. WASH. L. REV. !%($, !%#" (%(!") 
(explaining the di.culty of ,nding the optimal amount of delay, and whether the inquiry should be 
done on a rule-by-rule basis or on an agency-by-agency basis). 
192 See supra notes !!+–!!" and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, '% STAN. L. REV. !%$!, !#(& (!$$() 
(reviewing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME 
THEORY (!$"$)) (“An important form of precommitment is the elimination of subsequent unstable 
subgames. This in a sense is what Ulysses accomplished by having himself tied to the mast as his 
ship sailed past the Sirens.”). 
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against regulatory change, thus expanding an agency’s menu of policy 
options.#+&F194 Here, the judiciary could credibly ensure that an agency’s e,orts 
to disavow policymaking authority has teeth such that not even the agency 
could reverse course. A public and credible disavowal of authority should 
prevent Congress from being tempted to freeride.#+'F195 
This solution would be controversial. Chevron waiver, after all, has 
critics.#+(F196 But this is a di,erent type of Chevron waiver. It rubs some 
commentators wrong for an agency to tell a court whether to apply a legal 
test.#+)F197 Critics also fear that if agencies could waive deference during 
litigation, they may “take a dive” after a presidential change in order to 
undermine a rule promulgated by a prior administration without going 
through a new round of the notice-and-comment rulemaking.#+*F198 It is unclear 
whether the Supreme Court shares this fear of Chevron waiver; the Court has 
arguably embraced Chevron waiver during litigation.#++F199 Regardless, that is not 
the species of Chevron waiver proposed here. Rather than waiving deference 
during litigation, the agency would disavow deference before any rule exists at 
all in order to prompt congressional action. That is not a question of telling 
a court how to resolve a legal question or spiking a prior administration’s rule. 
Instead, it would be a tool to avert a collective-action problem that potentially 
would otherwise prevent anything from happening. 
To be clear, Chevron waiver would only help prevent a collective-action 
problem in situations where the agency’s interpretation is not the best one 
(in a court’s view) but is su-ciently reasonable that it would withstand 
 
194 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, "* U. CHI. L. REV. "*, $( (%(!") [hereinafter 
Nielson, Sticky Regulations] (“[O]ssi,cation can act as a credible commitment mechanism against 
change. Because regulated parties know that an agency must survive a procedural gauntlet to change 
a regulatory scheme, they can have more con,dence in that scheme’s stability. Under certain 
circumstances, that stability can encourage more activity of the sort that the agency wishes to 
encourage.” (citing Masur, supra note !"+, at !(#"-'*)). 
195 Cf., e.g., Fennell, supra note !!+, at !''"-*( (explaining that “a rule that limits bargaining 
options may simultaneously enhance bargaining leverage” and that “limits can often be 
conceptualized as legally imposed precommitment devices, similar to one party (A) tearing out her 
own steering wheel during a game of roadway Chicken with another party (B)”). 
196 See, e.g., James Durling & E. Garrett West, Essay, May Chevron Be Waived?, +! STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE !"#, !"' (%(!$) (“[C]ourts should not allow either private parties or agencies to waive 
Chevron.”); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, !#% HARV. L. REV. !*%(, !*%( (%(!$) (similar); Jeremy 
D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving Chevron, "* U. CHI. L. REV. !$%+, !$%" (%(!") (similar). 
197 See, e.g., Durling & West, supra note !$&, at !"" (“This principle—that parties may not forfeit, 
waive, or even stipulate to legal propositions—suggests a fundamental problem with Chevron waiver.”). 
198 See, e.g., id. at !"' (“This circumvention . . . allow[s] subsequent administrations to scuttle 
disfavored policies . . . [of] a prior administration’s regulatory actions.”). 
199 See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, !'( S. Ct. !'&%, !'+' (%(%() (applying Skidmore, 
rather than Chevron, where “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked [for] what the 
Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute”). 
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litigation (i.e., situations for which Chevron deference does actual work).$!!F200 
Likewise, for this version of the minor questions doctrine to succeed, the 
agency’s public disavowal of deference would have to be (somewhat$!#F201) 
irrevocable at least for a period of time—otherwise the collective-action 
problem would not disappear. And it is true that agencies might waive 
Chevron for non-minor questions. But it is unclear why they would do that. 
It makes sense for an agency to waive deference when deference makes it 
harder for the agency to accomplish its goal. It makes much less sense where 
the agency wants power to regulate or would not regulate anyway because it 
does not want the policy. Presumably, it is only when the agency wants the 
policy but is stuck in a collective-action dynamic that prospective waiver 
would make sense. Minor questions +t that bill in a way that other types of 
questions often do not. And if shirking is a problem, Congress could enact 
targeted statutes requiring the respective agency to address speci+c issues. 
This version of the minor questions doctrine thus should solve the 
collective-action problem in cases where it matters without obvious collateral 
damage. It also should appeal to common sense. Courts speak of “giving” 
agencies deference$!$F202; agencies thus arguably should be able to decline the 
gift when deference would hurt rather than help.$!%F203 The downside of this 
path, however, is that it would require creating a new mechanism in 
administrative law (prospective Chevron waiver) that is (fairly) avant-garde 
and may be hard to implement. 
C. Reverse the Chevron Presumption 
The third option would reverse the Chevron presumption. Recall that 
Chevron relies on an implicit delegation of authority; although Congress has 
not said so, courts presume that Congress has implicitly given agencies 
interpretative primacy for ambiguous language. But it is possible to reverse 
 
200 Many cases that mention “Chevron” do not involve deference. See Hickman & Nielson, 
supra note **, at $"&. 
201 The more certain the loss of policymaking power is, the more con,dent Congress will be 
that the agency really can’t act. That said, there could be an emergency exception, perhaps subject 
to judicial review. As noted, courts can act as a commitment mechanism to make agency claims 
credible. If an agency must o)er an especially compelling reason to break its vow, then the 
commitment would still be somewhat credible. See, e.g., Nielson, Sticky Regulations, supra note !$', 
at !!" (explaining that because of judicial review of various procedural requirements, agencies can 
credibly commit but still change their mind by “diverting resources away from other priorities”). 
202 See, e.g., Tex. O). of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, !"# F.#d #$#, ''+ (*th Cir. !$$$) (“[U]nder 
Chevron step-two, we usually give the agency deference in its interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
language . . . .”). 
203 Indeed, via Step One-and-a-Half, agencies sometimes already can and do decline the “gift” 
simply by saying during the rulemaking that the statute unambiguously compels the agency’s 
preferred interpretation. See generally Hemel & Nielson, supra note %+ (describing the doctrine). 
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that presumption; courts could defer only when Congress has expressly 
delegated that authority.$!&F204 
The advantage of this approach is that courts would not have to decide 
what is a minor question. Congress, a party to the collective-action problem, 
is better positioned to identify which policies are a,ected by collective-action 
dynamics. For such policies, Congress would not “turn on” deference.$!'F205 But 
for other policies where Congress believes that deference is su-ciently 
valuable, Congress would “turn on” deference. 
To be sure, reversing the presumption may be close to eliminating Chevron 
itself. The reason why Chevron is so significant is because it applies so broadly; 
if Congress were required to affirmatively enact deference through legislation, 
there likely would be less deference.$!(F206 That said, if reversing the presumption 
for all questions (subject to Congress’s power to turn deference back on) is too 
aggressive, Congress could turn off deference only for minor questions—
although, again, that would require identifying what is a minor question. 
Congress may not be willing to spend time on that undertaking. 
D. Which Version Is Best? 
Each of these options has pluses and minuses. The most intuitive solution 
would be to borrow from the major questions doctrine. The most targeted would 
be to create a new form of Chevron waiver. And the most foundational would be 
to reverse the Chevron presumption. Yet the minuses are also real. Borrowing 
from the major questions doctrine is easier said than done; a new form of 
Chevron waiver is unusual and potentially awkward in application; and reversing 
the Chevron presumption would be a big change. The key point, though, is that 
each option would reduce overlapping policymaking authority over minor 
questions. This Article thus offers a menu of options. Determining which one 
makes the most sense, if any, requires considering the overall costs and benefits 
of reform on other dimensions than those at issue here. 
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
When two entities want an outcome that is non-rivalrous and 
nonexcludable and either can bring it about, a collective-action problem may 
result. As this Article demonstrates, these conditions may characterize the 
 
204 This would not solve Justice Thomas’s constitutional concerns. See supra note '* and 
accompanying text. But it would eliminate any uncertainty about the meaning of statutory law. 
205 Alternatively, Congress could “turn on” deference, but also require the agency to act rather 
than giving the agency discretion whether to do so. 
206 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, $( N.Y.U. L. REV. !, + (%(!*) (explaining how 
rare it is for Congress to specify whether it wants deference). 
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relationship between the political branches in today’s world, especially for 
minor questions. Because of deference, accordingly, it is possible that some 
policies—at the margins—are shelved that otherwise would become law. A 
minor questions doctrine could address this stagnation. That said, there are 
important counterarguments to adopting such a doctrine. 
A. Do Minor Questions Matter? 
The most important counterargument asks whether this problem is 
signi+cant enough to justify reform. Flipping through the Code of Federal 
Regulations, there are many examples of agencies addressing minor 
questions—including the content of frozen cherry pie.$!)F207 Given that reality, 
do collective-action dynamics cause stagnation often enough in the real world 
that the bene+ts of a new doctrine are greater than its costs? 
Candidly, this is a di-cult question to answer. Because it is challenging 
to measure what did not happen, much less explain why it did not happen, it 
is necessarily also challenging to speak with con+dence about whether a minor 
questions doctrine is cost-justi+ed. True, the real-world examples identi+ed 
by Hemel suggest that deference sometimes creates a collective-action 
problem. And that very volume of provisions in the Code of Federal 
Regulations may also support the existence of a collective-action problem, on 
the theory that it may help explain why agencies and Congress alike often do 
not eliminate regulations that have become obsolete. But without knowing 
the respective values that Congress and the White House place on action and 
inaction, it is impossible to de+nitively answer how signi+cant the problem 
is, especially because there are many reasons policymakers do not act even for 
policies they want (such as resources constraints). So even if the potential 
collective-action dynamic identi+ed here matters for some policies, the extent 
of its e,ect is unclear. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to fear that this is a real problem. To begin, 
the theory here is not elaborate; it is a basic application of widely recognized 
principles of game theory. There are also at least some real-world examples 
of what looks like deference-caused inaction. 
In fact, there is an argument that minor questions should be a priority. 
Major questions, by de+nition, attract the sort of political attention that can 
moot the need for judicial review.$!*F208 Not so, however, with minor 
 
207 See Frozen Cherry Pie; Proposed Revocation of a Standard of Identity and a Standard of 
Quality, "* Fed. Reg. "%,#$*, "%,#$* (Dec. !", %(%() (to be codi,ed at %! C.F.R. pt. !*%) (proposing 
to “revoke the standard of identity and the standard of quality for frozen cherry pie”). 
208 This is to not say that the major questions doctrine does not serve important interests. See, 
e.g., Loshin & Nielson, supra note *, at &( (o)ering evidence that “the elephants-in-mouseholes 
doctrine was not created to enable the Court’s pursuit of its own policy preferences”). Thus, just 
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questions.$!+F209 Put another way, the risk that a collective-action dynamic may 
stymie policy is not limited to minor questions; it can also happen for other 
types of questions that are not bipartisan or technical. Some tax policies, for 
instance, are politically charged.$#!F210 For such issues, however, there is a strong 
argument that we should require congressional involvement.$##F211 At any rate, 
when divided government returns (as it regularly does), the collective-action 
problem for this category of policies should disappear.$#$F212 But that is not true 
for minor questions. Divided government does not solve the problem and it is 
hard to come up with a normative argument in favor of this type of inaction. 
Another counterargument is that even if Chevron may thwart 
policymaking for minor questions, it still may be worthwhile on net. Because 
of Chevron, stagnation may occur for some policies while increased activity 
may occur for others.$#%F213 Accordingly, to resolve the overall question, we 
would need a better sense of Chevron’s total costs and bene+ts, which we do 
not know. It does not follow, however, that a minor questions doctrine is not 
worth pursuing. This Article’s central claim is that we should expect 
stagnation to be most prevalent when the bene+ts of a policy are di,use but 
the costs are concentrated, especially if the policy is technical. Even without 
Chevron’s collective-action problem, that is a tough combination. Yet 
deference may make an already bad situation worse.$#&F214 
B. Why Hasn’t Congress Already Acted? 
Of course, all of this raises a separate question: if minor questions are a 
problem, why hasn’t Congress already responded? Congress can change 
 
because a major policy may be revisited later does not mean that a court should not properly apply 
the law during the interim. When the major questions doctrine should apply, however, is beyond 
this Article’s scope. 
209 For example, if the mutual inaction payo) in the matrix in Table # is changed from -! to -
.(!, the odds that anyone will act becomes vanishingly small. See supra Table #. 
210 See, e.g., Hemel, supra note !%, at &&&-&+ (noting an issue involving foreign tax credits placed 
by Democratic presidents in the Greenbook but not Republicans). 
211 See Manning, supra note *!, at %(( (explaining the value of congressional participation 
in policymaking). 
212 See Hemel, supra note !%, at &'' (“Presidents will be more willing to raise revenue 
unilaterally when Congress is strongly tax-averse, and Congress will be more willing to pass revenue-
raising legislation when the President is strongly tax-averse.”). 
213 See supra Section III.A; see also Hemel, supra note !%, at +!! (“The static and dynamic e)ects 
of deference cut in di)erent directions: deference makes it more likely that any particular Treasury 
regulation will pass judicial muster but less likely that Congress will act to raise revenues.”). 
214 This answer also assumes for the sake of argument that more government action is a good 
thing. As explained above, that assumption is the subject of debate. See, p. !!$!, supra. The key point 
for purposes here is that even if more action is good, deference may not always enable more action. 
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Chevron.$#'F215 So if deference creates a signi+cant collective-action problem, 
why hasn’t Congress already +xed it? In other words, doesn’t the fact that 
Congress has not acted or even expressed alarm speak volumes?$#(F216 
This point is also well taken. There are, however, at least four answers. 
First, it is not all clear that enough members of Congress have recognized the 
systemic nature of the problem. It is possible to experience a collective-action 
problem in a single case without recognizing that it applies in other cases, 
too. If members of Congress do not realize that the same dynamic may arise 
for many types of policies, it is easy to see why reform would be unattractive; 
any individual minor question may be too small to justify the e,orts 
associated with reform. Second, Congress may know about this dynamic but 
has concluded that the current framework is the best option and should be 
retained. Third, Congress may know about this dynamic but believe, wrongly, 
that there is no way out of it. And fourth, some in Congress may like this 
collective-action dynamic because it helps sophisticated operators stop 
legislation.$#)F217 In other words, the very dynamic that give rise to collective 
action problems for minor questions may also create pressure to keep that 
system in place. 
Which explanation (or explanations) is correct? We do not know. 
Congress has not spoken one way or the other. Instead, the Supreme Court 
has changed the status quo by creating Chevron without a clear statement from 
Congress (although, to be sure, some deference existed before Chevron$#*F218). 
Because (i) Congress has not addressed the issue but (ii) both theory and 
some real-world evidence suggest that a collective-action problem sometimes 
may exist, it is not at all clear that congressional silence should equal consent. 
C. A More Realistic Understanding of Policymaking? 
Another pushback challenges an assumption in this Article’s model, viz., 
that there are only two players in the game: Congress and the White House. 
This may be true for high-pro+le issues (such as those addressed by the major 
 
215 Because the theory of Chevron is implicit delegation, see, for example, United States v. 
Mead Corp., *## U.S. %!", %%$-#( (%((!), Congress could withdraw that delegation anytime it chose. 
See Scalia, supra note %", at *!+ (describing Chevron as “a background rule of law against which 
Congress can legislate”). 
216 See United States v. Lopez, *!" F.#d +$(, +$" (!(th Cir. %((") (explaining the “logical 
signi,cance of the dog that didn’t bark”); cf. MILAN M. 0IRKOVI!, THE GREAT SILENCE: THE 
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF FERMI’S PARADOX % (%(!") (explaining the theory that if aliens 
existed, “they would have been here already”). 
217 For what it is worth, this fourth possibility seems improbable. Not only does it require a large 
dose of cynicism, it is also quite elaborate. Even so, it may still be worth considering, even if the extreme 
version of public-choice theory does not fit reality. See supra note !!# and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has Awful 
E%ects, +( DUKE L.J. ONLINE $! (%(%!) (discussing emergence of Chevron deference). 
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questions doctrine or even some “ordinary” Chevron questions),$#+F219 but 
presumably it is much less often true for minor questions. Although the 
“executive Power” is vested in the President alone,$$!F220 no one argues that the 
President is personally involved in every decision.$$#F221 Countless decisions 
involving minor questions are made at the agency level, often by career 
o-cials.$$$F222 There are also independent agencies whose decisions are, at least 
in theory, isolated from presidential control.$$%F223 Against this more accurate 
backdrop, doesn’t it follow that in the real world, there is no meaningful 
collective-action problem? 
No. This Article uses the White House in its model because it is simpler. 
But White House participation is not necessary for this Article’s conclusions 
to hold. The collective-action problem can be between Congress and the 
White House, but it can also be between Congress and an agency. The key 
point is not who in the Executive Branch creates policy, but rather that 
someone there can do so. That point does not change when we adopt a more 
realistic view of policymaking. 
To be sure, it is no doubt true that, say, a career agency o-cial may assess 
costs and bene+ts di,erently from a political appointee in the White 
 
219 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated 
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, #* YALE J. ON REGUL. *'$, &(& (%(!") (pointing 
to white-collar enforcement in the Obama administration and deportation guidance in the Trump 
administration); Kagan, supra note !%&, at %%'" (pointing to health care, welfare reform, tobacco, and 
guns in the Clinton administration). 
220 See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, !'( S. Ct. %!"#, %!$! (%(%() (“Under 
our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § !, cl. !, § #)). 
221 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, *&$ U.S. %$(, #!# (%(!#) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Although the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal o.cers accountable, 
administrative agencies enjoy in practice a signi,cant degree of independence. As scholars have 
noted, ‘no President (or his executive o.ce sta)) could, and presumably none would wish to, 
supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.’” (quoting Kagan, supra note !%&, at %%*()). 
222 See, e.g., Adoption of Recommendations, Admin. Conference of U.S., "' Fed. Reg. +!,#'", 
+!,#*'-** (Dec. %+, %(!$) (explaining that “SES o.cials often . . . exercise ‘important policy-making, 
policy-determining, or other executive functions’” and that “[a]pproximately half of SES positions 
are reserved for career employees”). 
223 See, e.g., Seila Law, !'( S. Ct. at %%(#-(' (explaining independent agencies, i.e., those 
subject to a weaker presidential removal power). How independent many “independent” agencies 
are in practice is disputed. See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: 
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, "" B.U. L. REV. '*$, '$! (%((") (questioning 
the amount of agency independence in a polarized age); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of 
Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, &' TEX. L. REV. '&$, *!# (!$"*) (“The 
distinction between executive branch and independent agencies continues to thrive in political 
rhetoric, but it has virtually no life in the reality of agency practice.”). To the extent that agency 
independence is more theoretical than real, this objection loses force. 
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House.$$&F224 If so, this may change how often a collective-action problem occurs, 
but it would not eliminate the risk altogether, especially for policies without 
sharp political signi+cance. Moreover, technical issues—which, as this Article 
explains, also can create a minor-questions collective-action problem—are 
hard to address. A career o-cial may prefer not to expend the energy on a 
technical issue that will not advance his or her career, especially when 
someone else could do it.$$'F225 Or less cynically, a career o-cial may not be 
especially interested in some issue. At the margins, that person may be more 
inclined to act if no one else could. But if someone else could, that o-cial 
may stand aside. Of course, career o-cials may (or may not$$(F226) be more 
public-interest minded than political o-cials, which would make collective-
action dynamics less likely. They may also be more attentive to congressional 
wishes.$$)F227 But all of this would merely change the frequency of the problem, 
not its existence. 
At the same time, adding more players to the mix—Congress, the White 
House, an agency or agencies$$*F228, and different groups within agencies—may 
make the collective-action problem even more serious. This Article uses a two-
player model because it is simpler. But a model with more decisionmakers could 
be more susceptible to freeriding. It is a familiar insight in antitrust that the 
more players involved, the harder it is to prevent self-interested behavior by 
individuals within the group.$$+F229 Adding more policymakers into the model thus 
potentially may lead to more freeriding, not less.$%!F230 
Alternatively, what if we take a more realistic view of relative 
policymaking capacity? In particular, Congress is subject to bicameralism and 
 
224 See Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against 
Political Control, %" J.L. & POL. !%$, !#! (%(!#) (“Scholarship has long documented deep divisions 
within agencies and, more importantly, between political appointees and career sta).”). 
225 See Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, $( NOTRE DAME L. REV. !%&*, !%&"-&$ (%(!*) 
(explaining the incentives o.cials have to maximize their own interests). 
226 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, * HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
!, #&-#+ (%(!') (explaining that “bureaucrats [may] care more for routine than for results” and 
develop “vast bureaucratic mechanisms” as ends unto themselves (quotations omitted)). Once more, 
the truth may be somewhere in the middle. This is another empirical question. 
227 See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, !&* U. PA. L. REV. !#++, !'#(-#! (%(!+) 
(explaining how attentive o.cials are to congressional requests). 
228 See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, "$ 
IOWA L. REV. !, %% (%((#) (“[A] social ill is less likely to be addressed by regulatory action [where there 
is overlapping policymaking authority than] where a particular institution is viewed by all as having 
regulatory primacy.”). But see Freeman & Rossi, supra note !#', at !!*!-** (defending redundancy). 
229 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE !$%-$# (*th ed. %(!&) (describing the freeriding problem and 
self-interested behavior in the context of cartels). 
230 See OLSON, supra note !(', at %-# (explaining that collective-action problems are worse for 
larger groups). 
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presentment$%#F231; agencies are not.$%$F232 Thus, because it is harder for Congress 
to act, won’t the executive branch realize that it should act rather than waiting 
for Congress? Perhaps, but likely not. In fact, the harder it is for Congress to 
act, the more inaction we should expect (all else being held constant).$%%F233 
Granted, Congress has other means to force action—such as its power over 
budgets$%&F234 and general oversight functions$%'F235—and as the costs of new 
legislation increase for Congress, it may be more willing to use these means. 
But again, this should just change the frequency of the collective-action 
dynamic, not its existence. How often inaction occurs (or, put another way, 
how powerful Congress’s other means of spurring regulatory action are) is 
another empirical question that has not been answered.$%(F236 
D. Are There Better Solutions? 
Even if Chevron causes a collective-action problem, are there not better 
ways to solve it? As noted above, culture—including fairness and cooperation 
norms$%)F237—can mitigate collective-action problems. So might not fairness and 
 
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § +, cls. %-#; see also Manning, supra note *!, at !$" (elaborating on 
these requirements). 
232 Agencies might, however, be subject to an ossi,ed rulemaking process. See, e.g., Nielson, 
Sticky Regulations, supra note !$'!$', at "$ (explaining the empirical debate about the extent to which 
procedural requirements impede agency action). 
233 In terms of the Snowdrift Game, when action becomes relatively less attractive, the 
incentive to stay in the car increases for one of the players. Both intuitively and mathematically, 
there is no reason to think that the decreased incentive to act for one player will be entirely o)set 
by a change in the other player’s strategy. Holding the payo)s from action constant (as we must), 
the only implication of moving from a world of symmetrical costs to a world of asymmetrical costs 
in which one party’s costs have increased while the other party’s costs have remained constant along 
all relevant dimensions is a reduced overall likelihood of action. 
Notably, the inverse is also true; if it becomes easier for one player to act while everything 
remains constant for the other player, we should expect less inaction. Applied here, this would mean 
that if, say, Congress could increase its policymaking capacity in a way that would allow the costs of 
congressional action to decrease, then we should expect less stagnation. As explained above, however, 
there may be limits on Congress’s ability to increase its policymaking capacity. See supra note !#". 
And needless to say, for such increased capacity to make sense, the bene,ts of that capacity increase 
would have to be greater than its costs. 
234 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Essay, The Federal Trade Commission as an 
Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and E%ectiveness, !(( IOWA L. REV. %("*, %!(' (%(!*) 
(recounting how a threat to reduce funding for DOJ and FTC changed agency behavior). 
235 See, e.g., Christopher M. Davis et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv. RL#(%'(, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT MANUAL (%(%() (discussing how Congress may exercise oversight). 
236 To be sure, if Congress could always prevent the collective-action dynamic discussed in this 
Article through non-legislative, (arguably) low-cost tools like oversight hearings and budget threats, 
then those tools themselves could be a viable alternative to a minor questions doctrine. Professor 
Hemel’s real-world tax examples from the Greenbook, however, at least suggests that such tools may 
not always be su.cient. See pp. !%!'–!*, supra. 
237 This idea that there are fairness norms against which negotiating parties act is supported 
by the literature surrounding the so-called “ultimatum game,” in which two parties negotiate over a 
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cooperation norms mitigate Chevron’s collective-action problem? This 
counterargument is fair but not dispositive. Are there such norms? And if so, 
are they strong enough to solve the collective-action problem or do they just 
make it less common? 
Alternatively, rather than relying on fairness and cooperation norms, 
Congress could solve the collective-action problem by taking away an agency’s 
ability to stand down. If an agency must address a problem, there will not be 
stagnation. Yet there are many good reasons why agencies choose not to act. 
Agencies regularly stand aside, for example, not because of collective-action 
dynamics, but instead because they don’t want the policy at all and would 
oppose it even if there was no collective-action problem. In other words, they 
have a dominant strategy not to act. It is only when the agency doesn’t act 
because of collective-action dynamics, however, that we should be 
concerned.$%*F238 It is di-cult to identify that sort of policy ex ante or 
categorically. Congress, of course, could solve this problem through targeted 
legislation after a collective-action dynamic emerges—but if Congress is 
going to do that, why not just create the policy?$%+F239 
Taking a more realistic view of agencies (as explained above), another 
potential solution could be self-policing by the Executive Branch. If agencies 
are trying to freeride o, of other agencies with overlapping jurisdiction or 
o, of Congress (which by de+nition has overlapping jurisdiction), perhaps 
oversight by the O-ce of Information and Regulatory A,airs (OIRA) within 
the White House’s O-ce of Management and Budget could spur agency 
 
surplus. Studies suggest that notions of fairness may lead to a more even distribution. See, e.g., 
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, % J. ECON. PERSPS., Autumn !$$", at !$*, !$+-
$" (describing experiments that suggest that generous o)ers in the ultimatum game are best 
explained by fairness concerns). That said, the robustness of that “fairness” e)ect may dissipate in 
certain situations, such as litigation. See Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, Fairness in an Embedded 
Ultimatum Game, *# J.L. & ECON. %&#, %&' (%(!() (“Our results suggest that fairness considerations 
are a good deal less important in stylized legal bargaining than in the simple ultimatum game.”). 
238 There are also important Article II issues. It not always clear that Congress could force the 
Executive Branch to act. Questions about the relationship between the Take Care Clause and the 
Executive Vesting Clause are beyond this Article’s scope. For a discussion of when the executive 
branch may properly decline to enforce the law, see, for example, Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, !&' U. PA. L. REV. !"#*, !"&#-&' (%(!&); Zachary S. Price, 
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, &+ VAND. L. REV. &+!, &+'-+* (%(!'). 
239 Another possible solution would be for Congress to create a mechanism to disable itself 
when a collective-action problem emerges. The problem with this solution is two-fold. First, if 
Congress is going to expend that e)ort, it arguably should just address the policy issue. Second, 
Congress often cannot bind itself, at least not very well. Partisan divide may act as a commitment 
mechanism against legislative action for some policies (such as major questions or other political 
ones), but that e)ect is less pronounced for minor questions. Notably, the fact that Congress cannot 
irrevocably “turn o) ” its legislative power is almost certainly a good thing, even if it means that 
Congress cannot unilaterally end a collective-action problem. See Manning, supra note *!, at %(( 
(explaining how a multicameral system acts as a safeguard against “oppressive legislation”). 
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action. Just as OIRA reviews the most important regulations,$&!F240 perhaps it 
would also be directed by executive order or statute to target freeriding for 
minor ones. There is much to be said for this option—at least for issues that 
do not involve the White House itself (such as Hemel’s tax examples from 
the Greenbook). Unfortunately, adding more responsibility to its portfolio 
would stretch OIRA’s resources even further, especially if agencies actively 
avoid review.$&#F241 OIRA review, although perhaps part of the solution, is thus 
not a panacea. Similar things can be said about ombudsmen, such as the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service with the Internal Revenue Service.$&$F242 Such 
entities may help to identify issues that the agency is not addressing but, as 
Hemel’s tax examples demonstrate, do not appear to be a silver bullet. 
E. What About Delegation Generally? 
Finally, if Chevron creates a collective-action problem by empowering 
two branches to share the same policymaking space, then don’t all 
delegations also do the same? Yet delegated authority is everywhere. $&%F243 So 
why worry about Chevron? 
It is true that this Article’s logic suggests that delegation generally$&&F244 also 
enables collective-action dynamics. Because agencies can regulate, say, in the 
“public interest,”$&'F245 Congress may do less than it otherwise would, and 
agencies, in turn, may reciprocate. This e,ect of delegation no doubt merits 
extended attention. But it does now follow that we should not also worry 
about Chevron. In fact, there are a couple of reasons to focus on Chevron in 
particular. First, Chevron is more manageable. How courts should enforce the 
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nondelegation doctrine is di-cult.$&(F246 By contrast, it should be more 
straightforward to mitigate Chevron’s collective-action problem. And second, 
delegation involves an express choice by Congress. Deference, by contrast, is 
more a creature of the judiciary. It is one thing for Congress to create a 
collective-action problem for itself. It is something else for courts to spring 
one on Congress.$&)F247 
*      *      * 
There are no doubt other counterarguments. None of the most obvious ones, 
however, defeat the need for a minor questions doctrine—at least based on what 
we know so far. Unfortunately, uncertainty in administrative law is par for the 
course. We don’t know much about many things.$&*F248 This means we must make 
an educated guess about the key empirical question. Because this Article offers 
a coherent theory backed by real-world examples, we should be confident that 
there isn’t a significant collective-action problem before simply accepting the 
status quo. At a minimum, targeted empirical study is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
“[I]t takes chutzpah to write about Chevron.”$&+F249 It takes even more 
chutzpah to say we have overlooked something important for decades. But 
that is what this Article contends. Under a reasonable set of assumptions, we 
should expect that Chevron sometimes stymies policymaking. Thus, whatever 
one thinks of the usual back-and-forth about Chevron, the story is more 
complicated. Because both branches can act, and because both would prefer the 
other do so, each may shirk. 
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If this “collective action” account is correct, then no matter one’s priors 
about the administrative state, deference’s place in it becomes more 
complicated. And this is especially true for minor questions, which, not by 
accident, do not receive much attention anyway. Those who embrace Chevron 
because they believe it facilitates good policy must also confront the 
possibility that it may also do the opposite. Sometimes deference allows 
agencies to act when Congress has overlooked a problem. And sometimes it 
facilitates the emergence of policy that Congress does not want, which is 
problematic for other reasons.$'!F250 But deference also may prevent bene+cial 
policies from becoming law in the +rst place. In making an overall assessment 
of Chevron, it is incomplete to simply point to the good things it enables; one 
must also consider the good things it may prevent. 
Accordingly, although the high-pro+le debate about major questions is 
important, we should not lose sight of the complete picture. Major questions 
are signi+cant and will continue to be so. Yet counterintuitively, when it 
comes to deference, “humdrum, run-of-the-mill stu,”$'#F251 may turn out to be 
no less signi+cant. The Chevron debate overlooks this point. That is why the 
time has come to consider a minor questions doctrine. 
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